Skills/npm/onionskin-cli

onionskin-cli@0.0.5

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Edit Word, Excel, PowerPoint and HTML files in the browser and send the batch to a coding agent." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher abe238 · publishing for 6 daysInstalls 565Last detonated 14 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 78 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What changed since 0.0.3

vet-skills diff onionskin-cli 0.0.3 0.0.5

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.0.3 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 75/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: URL with embedded credentials; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.4sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.5sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.6sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.7sprocess8 of 78 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.7sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.7sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.7sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/reply.js:428 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// the batch is finished: say so first, so a kill or a failure while waiting for the next batch never hides the resultFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialssrc/update.js:22 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking* first "/" after the scheme: a user name hides the real host (http://127.0.0.1:[email protected]/ is evil.example). Read as text, the wayFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/doctor.js:249 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsadd(ours ? "OK" : "NOTE", "state folder", `${state} mode ${(st.mode & 0o777).toString(8)}, ${st.uid === process.getuid() ? "owned by you" : "NOT owned by you"}`, { fix: `chmod 700 ${state}` });Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/setup.js:54 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files/** The person's own voice guide beside the skill (src/voice-store.js reads it like a .env): never copied to an installed skill folder, never compared. */Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/voice-store.js:185 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// The guide as a file beside the skill, read the way a .env is: skills/onionskin/voice.md in this app's folder (never in git, never in theFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/checker.js:78 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes* wait. `cancel()` ends it now, running or waiting: SIGTERM makes check.py kill its soffice process group; check.py also exits on its ownFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/session.js:2426 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files/** style.json and voice-guide.json changed by something else while this run was out (an agent with a shell, say): already put back by their stores. */Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/session.js:1966 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files// style.json changed by something else while this batch was out (an agent with a shell, say): already put back by src/style.jsFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/session.js:485 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// a hard kill can leave work in flight that no result will ever settleFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/voice-store.js:5 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files// voice-guide.json: {v:1, text, on, send?: "short"}: the person's own saved guide, at most 7,000 characters. `send: "short"` sends onlyFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈50 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for onionskin-cli@0.0.5 as of 1 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

5 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim abe238: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim abe238Propose a patch to the maintainer