onionskin-cli@0.0.5
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Edit Word, Excel, PowerPoint and HTML files in the browser and send the batch to a coding agent." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 8 of 78 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What changed since 0.0.3
vet-skills diff onionskin-cli 0.0.3 0.0.5In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.0.3 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 75/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: URL with embedded credentials; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
// the batch is finished: say so first, so a kill or a failure while waiting for the next batch never hides the resultFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* first "/" after the scheme: a user name hides the real host (http://127.0.0.1:[email protected]/ is evil.example). Read as text, the wayFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.add(ours ? "OK" : "NOTE", "state folder", `${state} mode ${(st.mode & 0o777).toString(8)}, ${st.uid === process.getuid() ? "owned by you" : "NOT owned by you"}`, { fix: `chmod 700 ${state}` });Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts./** The person's own voice guide beside the skill (src/voice-store.js reads it like a .env): never copied to an installed skill folder, never compared. */Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// The guide as a file beside the skill, read the way a .env is: skills/onionskin/voice.md in this app's folder (never in git, never in theFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* wait. `cancel()` ends it now, running or waiting: SIGTERM makes check.py kill its soffice process group; check.py also exits on its ownFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell./** style.json and voice-guide.json changed by something else while this run was out (an agent with a shell, say): already put back by their stores. */Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.// style.json changed by something else while this batch was out (an agent with a shell, say): already put back by src/style.jsFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.// a hard kill can leave work in flight that no result will ever settleFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// voice-guide.json: {v:1, text, on, send?: "short"}: the person's own saved guide, at most 7,000 characters. `send: "short"` sends onlyFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for onionskin-cli@0.0.5 as of 1 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
5 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim abe238: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.