onionskin-cli@0.0.3
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Edit Word, Excel and PowerPoint files in the browser and send the batch to a coding agent." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 8 of 78 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
/** The person's own voice guide beside the skill (src/voice-store.js reads it like a .env): never copied to an installed skill folder, never compared. */Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// a hard kill can leave work in flight that no result will ever settleFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.add(ours ? "OK" : "NOTE", "state folder", `${state} mode ${(st.mode & 0o777).toString(8)}, ${st.uid === process.getuid() ? "owned by you" : "NOT owned by you"}`, { fix: `chmod 700 ${state}` });Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.p = subprocess.Popen(cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, start_new_session=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out./** Server shutdown: every agent's group is signaled; resolves when they all exited or after the kill delay. */Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// the batch is finished: say so first, so a kill or a failure while waiting for the next batch never hides the resultFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* wait. `cancel()` ends it now, running or waiting: SIGTERM makes check.py kill its soffice process group; check.py also exits on its ownFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell./** style.json and voice-guide.json changed by something else while this run was out (an agent with a shell, say): already put back by their stores. */Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.// voice-guide.json: {v:1, text, on, send?: "short"}: the person's own saved guide, at most 7,000 characters. `send: "short"` sends onlyFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.for (const z of [za, zb]) for (const n of z.names) if (/\.xml$/i.test(n)) idsIn(z.readText(n), inputIds);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.// style.json changed by something else while this batch was out (an agent with a shell, say): already put back by src/style.jsFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.// The guide as a file beside the skill, read the way a .env is: skills/onionskin/voice.md in this app's folder (never in git, never in theFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.const kill = deps.kill || ((pid, sig) => process.kill(pid, sig));Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for onionskin-cli@0.0.3 as of 23 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim abe238: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.