Skills/npm/onionskin-cli

onionskin-cli@0.0.3

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Edit Word, Excel and PowerPoint files in the browser and send the batch to a coding agent." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher abe238 · publishing for 4 daysInstalls 432Last detonated 48 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 78 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexited 3:
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.5sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.6sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.6sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.7sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.7sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.8sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.8sprocess8 of 78 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.8sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.8sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.8sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/setup.js:54 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files/** The person's own voice guide beside the skill (src/voice-store.js reads it like a .env): never copied to an installed skill folder, never compared. */Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/session.js:247 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// a hard kill can leave work in flight that no result will ever settleFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/doctor.js:249 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsadd(ours ? "OK" : "NOTE", "state folder", `${state} mode ${(st.mode & 0o777).toString(8)}, ${st.uid === process.getuid() ? "owned by you" : "NOT owned by you"}`, { fix: `chmod 700 ${state}` });Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/checker/check.py:226 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.Popen(cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, start_new_session=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/agent-runner.js:435 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes/** Server shutdown: every agent's group is signaled; resolves when they all exited or after the kill delay. */Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/reply.js:401 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// the batch is finished: say so first, so a kill or a failure while waiting for the next batch never hides the resultFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/checker.js:78 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes* wait. `cancel()` ends it now, running or waiting: SIGTERM makes check.py kill its soffice process group; check.py also exits on its ownFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/session.js:1579 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files/** style.json and voice-guide.json changed by something else while this run was out (an agent with a shell, say): already put back by their stores. */Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/voice-store.js:5 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files// voice-guide.json: {v:1, text, on, send?: "short"}: the person's own saved guide, at most 7,000 characters. `send: "short"` sends onlyFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/redline-check.js:214 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesfor (const z of [za, zb]) for (const n of z.names) if (/\.xml$/i.test(n)) idsIn(z.readText(n), inputIds);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/session.js:1154 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files// style.json changed by something else while this batch was out (an agent with a shell, say): already put back by src/style.jsFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/voice-store.js:185 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files// The guide as a file beside the skill, read the way a .env is: skills/onionskin/voice.md in this app's folder (never in git, never in theFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/agent-runner.js:71 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesconst kill = deps.kill || ((pid, sig) => process.kill(pid, sig));Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈49 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for onionskin-cli@0.0.3 as of 13 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim abe238: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  4. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim abe238Propose a patch to the maintainer