mcp-server@2.6.10
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "BrowserStack's Official MCP Server" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
ASK_BROWSERSTACK_AUTH_TOKEN_URLBROWSERSTACK_ACCESS_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: ASK_BROWSERSTACK_ATLAS_URL, ASK_BROWSERSTACK_RELAY_TRANSPORT, BROWSERSTACK_AUTOMATION_BASE_URL, BROWSERSTACK_O11Y_UI_BASE_URL, BROWSERSTACK_USERNAME, DEV_MODE, MCP_UPLOAD_BASE_DIR, O11Y_TFA_RCA_BASE_URL, REMOTE_MCP, USE_OWN_LOCAL_BINARY_PROCESS- Where it talks to
- browserstack.com (its own)
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for ASK_BROWSERSTACK_AUTH_TOKEN_URL, BROWSERSTACK_ACCESS_KEY and talks to browserstack.com. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 2.6.9
vet-skills diff mcp-server 2.6.9 2.6.10In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 2.6.9 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
- No longer contacted
- percy.io
2.6.9 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 13 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
// Check and kill any existing BrowserStackLocal processes before starting new oneFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.// ASK_BROWSERSTACK_DISABLED is deliberately NOT here: it is a kill switch, and readingFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.