Skills/npm/mcp-server

mcp-server@2.6.9

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "BrowserStack's Official MCP Server" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher browserstack · publishing for 574 daysInstalls 121KLast detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ASK_BROWSERSTACK_AUTH_TOKEN_URLBROWSERSTACK_ACCESS_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: ASK_BROWSERSTACK_ATLAS_URL, ASK_BROWSERSTACK_RELAY_TRANSPORT, BROWSERSTACK_AUTOMATION_BASE_URL, BROWSERSTACK_O11Y_UI_BASE_URL, BROWSERSTACK_USERNAME, DEV_MODE, MCP_UPLOAD_BASE_DIR, O11Y_TFA_RCA_BASE_URL, REMOTE_MCP, USE_OWN_LOCAL_BINARY_PROCESS
Where it talks to
browserstack.com (its own)Also percy.io — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
nothing has run yet
What we could not test
everything: the server has not run yet

Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 2.6.8

vet-skills diff mcp-server 2.6.8 2.6.9

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 2.6.8 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

2.6.8 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-17 and scored it 56/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialsdist/tools/run-percy-scan.js:39 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineeringDo not paste the token into chat or commit it.`;Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/lib/upload-validator.js:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* - No path segment is a hidden dir/file (starts with `.`); blocks ~/.ssh,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/lib/upload-validator.js:13 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* ~/.aws, .env, etc. even after symlink resolutionFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/config.js:58 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// ASK_BROWSERSTACK_DISABLED is deliberately NOT here: it is a kill switch, and readingFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/tools/run-percy-scan.js:33 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…tps://percy.io → Project Settings → Project Token) and add it to your project's .env file (PERCY_TOKEN=<your Percy project token>) or export it in your shell: - …Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/lib/local.js:42 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// Check and kill any existing BrowserStackLocal processes before starting new oneFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈47 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

24 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim browserstack: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim browserstackPropose a patch to the maintainer