Skills/npm/mcp-server

mcp-server@2.6.6

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "BrowserStack's Official MCP Server" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher browserstack · publishing for 571 daysInstalls 117KLast detonated 3d ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ASK_BROWSERSTACK_AUTH_TOKEN_URLBROWSERSTACK_ACCESS_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: ASK_BROWSERSTACK_ATLAS_URL, ASK_BROWSERSTACK_RELAY_TRANSPORT, BROWSERSTACK_AUTOMATION_BASE_URL, BROWSERSTACK_O11Y_UI_BASE_URL, BROWSERSTACK_USERNAME, DEV_MODE, MCP_UPLOAD_BASE_DIR, O11Y_TFA_RCA_BASE_URL, REMOTE_MCP, USE_OWN_LOCAL_BINARY_PROCESS
Where it talks to
browserstack.com (its own)Also percy.io — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names percy.io as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ASK_BROWSERSTACK_AUTH_TOKEN_URL, BROWSERSTACK_ACCESS_KEY only into requests to browserstack.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets ASK_BROWSERSTACK_AUTH_TOKEN_URL=browserstack.com,BROWSERSTACK_ACCESS_KEY=browserstack.com -- npx -y @browserstack/mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 13 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
13sprocessdependency install exit 1 · (Use `node --trace-warnings ...` to show where the warning was created) npm error Cannot read properties of null (reading 'edgesOut') npm error A complete log of this run can be found in: /tmp/ks-detonate-dH8Lwr/task/home/.npm/_logs/2026-11-11T16_22_53_814Z-debug-0.log
13sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
13sprocessscript backend runs setup only
13sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialsdist/tools/run-percy-scan.js:39 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineeringDo not paste the token into chat or commit it.`;Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/lib/local.js:41 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// Check and kill any existing BrowserStackLocal processes before starting new oneFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/lib/upload-validator.js:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* - No path segment is a hidden dir/file (starts with `.`); blocks ~/.ssh,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/lib/upload-validator.js:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files* ~/.aws, .env, etc. even after symlink resolutionFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/config.js:58 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// ASK_BROWSERSTACK_DISABLED is deliberately NOT here: it is a kill switch, and readingFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/tools/run-percy-scan.js:33 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…tps://percy.io → Project Settings → Project Token) and add it to your project's .env file (PERCY_TOKEN=<your Percy project token>) or export it in your shell: - …Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈47 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @browserstack/mcp-server@2.6.6 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim browserstack: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim browserstackPropose a patch to the maintainer