Skills/npm/mcp-server

mcp-server@1.0.262

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "AI-controlled email operations control plane for campaigns, contacts, segments, analytics, and multi-provider sending via MCP." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server) · listed in the official MCP RegistryPublisher sendinel · publishing for 139 daysInstalls 46,672Last detonated 11 min ago
$claude mcp add mcp-server -- npx -y @sendinel/mcp-server
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Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ANTHROPIC_API_KEYMAX_ACTIVE_API_KEYSSENDINEL_API_KEYSYNCHRONEX_SERVICE_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: APP_URL, CLOUDFLARE_R2_PUBLIC_URL, MCP_SERVER_PORT, MCP_TOOL_SCAN_ALLOWLIST, MCP_TOOL_SCAN_MODE, MCP_TRANSPORT, NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL, SENDINEL_APP_URL, SENDINEL_ENCRYPTION_KEY, SENDINEL_PROJECT_ID, SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY, SUPABASE_URL, SYNCHRONEX_BASE_URL, SYNCHRONEX_JWKS_URL
Where it talks to
sendinel.ai (its own)Also synchronex.ai, twilio.com, telnyx.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names synchronex.ai, twilio.com, telnyx.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, MAX_ACTIVE_API_KEYS, SENDINEL_API_KEY, SYNCHRONEX_SERVICE_TOKEN only into requests to sendinel.ai (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sendinel.ai,MAX_ACTIVE_API_KEYS=sendinel.ai,SENDINEL_API_KEY=sendinel.ai,SYNCHRONEX_SERVICE_TOKEN=sendinel.ai -- npx -y @sendinel/mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 1.0.256

vet-skills diff mcp-server 1.0.256 1.0.262

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 1.0.256 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 35 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
15sprocessdependency install exit 0
35sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · code: 'ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND', url: 'file:///tmp/ks-detonate-o05zgx/task/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/mcp-server/build/lib/approval-elicitation.js' } Node.js v22.23.5
35sprocessscript backend runs setup only
35sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionbuild/tools/campaigns.js:2898 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesreturn { ...txt('Error: Internal server error'), ...sendError('internal_error') };Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsbuild/index.js:5 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconfig({ path: resolve(__dirname, '../.env') });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionbuild/index.js:129 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`Sendinel MCP server running on http://localhost:${port}/mcp`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionbuild/tools/campaigns.js:2947 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesreturn { ...txt(`Error: Send failed — ${safe.error} (${code})`), error: safe.error, code };Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈70 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.