mcp-server@1.0.229
VERIFIED· startup onlyPublisher claims: "AI-controlled email operations control plane for campaigns, contacts, segments, analytics, and multi-provider sending via MCP." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
ANTHROPIC_API_KEYMAX_ACTIVE_API_KEYSSENDINEL_API_KEYSYNCHRONEX_SERVICE_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: APP_URL, MCP_SERVER_PORT, MCP_TOOL_SCAN_ALLOWLIST, MCP_TOOL_SCAN_MODE, MCP_TRANSPORT, NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL, SENDINEL_APP_URL, SENDINEL_ENCRYPTION_KEY, SENDINEL_PROJECT_ID, SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY, SUPABASE_URL, SYNCHRONEX_BASE_URL, SYNCHRONEX_JWKS_URL- Where it talks to
- sendinel.ai (its own)Also synchronex.ai, twilio.com, telnyx.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names synchronex.ai, twilio.com, telnyx.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, MAX_ACTIVE_API_KEYS, SENDINEL_API_KEY, SYNCHRONEX_SERVICE_TOKEN only into requests to sendinel.ai (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 39 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
return { ...txt('Error: Internal server error'), ...sendError('internal_error') };Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.console.log(`Sendinel MCP server running on http://localhost:${port}/mcp`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.config({ path: resolve(__dirname, '../.env') });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.return { ...txt(`Error: Send failed — ${safe.error} (${code})`), error: safe.error, code };Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @sendinel/mcp-server@1.0.229 as of 38 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.