mcp-server@1.0.190
VERIFIED· startup onlyPublisher claims: "AI-controlled email operations control plane for campaigns, contacts, segments, analytics, and multi-provider sending via MCP." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
ANTHROPIC_API_KEYSENDINEL_API_KEYSYNCHRONEX_SERVICE_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: APP_URL, MCP_SERVER_PORT, MCP_TOOL_SCAN_ALLOWLIST, MCP_TOOL_SCAN_MODE, MCP_TRANSPORT, NEXT_PUBLIC_APP_URL, SENDINEL_APP_URL, SENDINEL_ENCRYPTION_KEY, SENDINEL_PROJECT_ID, SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY, SUPABASE_URL, SYNCHRONEX_BASE_URL, SYNCHRONEX_JWKS_URL- Where it talks to
- sendinel.ai (its own)Also synchronex.ai, twilio.com, telnyx.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names synchronex.ai, twilio.com, telnyx.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, SENDINEL_API_KEY, SYNCHRONEX_SERVICE_TOKEN only into requests to sendinel.ai (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 43 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
return { ...txt('Error: Internal server error'), ...sendError('internal_error') };Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.return { ...txt(`Error: Send failed — ${safe.error} (${code})`), error: safe.error, code };Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.console.log(`Sendinel MCP server running on http://localhost:${port}/mcp`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.config({ path: resolve(__dirname, '../.env') });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @sendinel/mcp-server@1.0.190 as of 6d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.