Skills/npm/dev-workflow-mcp-server

dev-workflow-mcp-server@1.32.8

CAUTION· startup only

Publisher claims: "MCP server to enforce development workflow discipline" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher programinglive · publishing for 397 daysInstalls 25,082Last detonated 28 min ago

Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ADMIN_PASSWORDDATABASE_URLDEVWF_MONITOR_TOKENDEVWF_REAPER_SECRETDEVWF_REAPER_SECRETSSENTRY_ACCESS_TOKENSENTRY_AUTH_TOKENZETTLY_API_TOKENZETTLY_CLI_TOKENZETTLY_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: ADMIN_EMAIL, ADMIN_USERNAME, DEFAULT_PRD_DISPLAY_PATH, DEV_WORKFLOW_DB_PATH, DEV_WORKFLOW_DB_TYPE, DEV_WORKFLOW_SECURITY_MODE, DEV_WORKFLOW_STATE_FILE, DEVWF_ACQUIRE_SEQ_DIR, DEVWF_AGENT, DEVWF_FLEET_LOCAL_ONLY, DEVWF_LOCAL_URL, DEVWF_MACHINE, DEVWF_MANAGED_CACHE, DEVWF_MONITOR_ENV_FILE, DEVWF_MONITOR_HEARTBEAT_MS, DEVWF_MONITOR_URL, DEVWF_PROFILE_DIR, DEVWF_PUBLIC_LOCAL_FIRST, DEVWF_REAPER_DRY_RUN, DEVWF_RELEASE_REVISION, DEVWF_RELEASE_URL, DEVWF_RELEASE_VERSION, DEVWF_SENTRY_CONFIG, DEVWF_SKIP_ZETTLY, DEVWF_STATE_ROOT, DEVWF_TEST_HOME, DEVWF_ZETTLY_ALLOW_LEGACY_CONFIG, DEVWF_ZETTLY_CONFIG, DEVWF_ZETTLY_SYNC, GITHUB_REF_NAME
Where it talks to
programinglive.com (its own)Also monitor-host.example, githubusercontent.com, opencode.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names monitor-host.example, githubusercontent.com, opencode.ai as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ADMIN_PASSWORD, DATABASE_URL, DEVWF_MONITOR_TOKEN, DEVWF_REAPER_SECRET, DEVWF_REAPER_SECRETS, SENTRY_ACCESS_TOKEN, SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN, ZETTLY_API_TOKEN, ZETTLY_CLI_TOKEN, ZETTLY_TOKEN only into requests to programinglive.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets ADMIN_PASSWORD=programinglive.com,DATABASE_URL=programinglive.com,DEVWF_MONITOR_TOKEN=programinglive.com,DEVWF_REAPER_SECRET=programinglive.com,DEVWF_REAPER_SECRETS=programinglive.com,SENTRY_ACCESS_TOKEN=programinglive.com,SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN=programinglive.com,ZETTLY_API_TOKEN=programinglive.com,ZETTLY_CLI_TOKEN=programinglive.com,ZETTLY_TOKEN=programinglive.com -- npx -y @programinglive/dev-workflow-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 1.32.0

vet-skills diff dev-workflow-mcp-server 1.32.0 1.32.8

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 1.32.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 37 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.1sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.1sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.2sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
16sprocessdependency install exit 0
36sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · code: 'ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND', url: 'file:///tmp/ks-detonate-qpoi1H/task/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/dev-workflow-mcp-server/security/sanitizer.js' } Node.js v22.23.5
36sprocessscript backend runs setup only
36sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
36sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
36sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5

Static findings

HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/share-growth.sh:5 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesQ() { sudo -u postgres psql -d devwf_monitor -tAc "$1"; }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLscripts/bootstrap-unix.sh:32 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourcebrew install rtk || curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rtk-ai/rtk/refs/heads/master/install.sh | shFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathszettly-client.js:78 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst config=readZettlyConfig({...env,ZETTLY_API_BASE:profileBase,ZETTLY_API_TOKEN:creds.token});Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addressscripts/session-reaper.cjs:18 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringconst DEFAULT_MONITOR = process.env.DEVWF_MONITOR_URL || 'http://100.77.138.14:3100';Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathszettly-client.js:85 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif(token){const config=readZettlyConfig({...env,ZETTLY_API_BASE:base,ZETTLY_API_TOKEN:token});return config?{...config,source:'windows-dpapi',expectedUserId}:null;}Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/setup-test-dbs.sh:41 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo -u postgres psql -d "${PG_DB}" -c "GRANT ALL ON SCHEMA public TO ${PG_USER};" > /dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/bootstrap-unix.sh:32 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codebrew install rtk || curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rtk-ai/rtk/refs/heads/master/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/release.cjs:383 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst nextEnv = { ...env };Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/setup-test-dbs.sh:5 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges# Run this on bw-server (it uses sudo locally). It creates:Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:20 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschown -R node:node /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/setup-test-dbs.sh:38 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo -u postgres psql -tAc "SELECT 1 FROM pg_database WHERE datname='${PG_DB}'" | grep -q 1 \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/bootstrap-unix.sh:32 · Remote installer piped to shellbrew install rtk || curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rtk-ai/rtk/refs/heads/master/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathszettly-client.js:95 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst config=token&&readZettlyConfig({...env,ZETTLY_API_BASE:base,ZETTLY_API_TOKEN:token});Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addressscripts/session-reaper.cjs:15 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filtering* node scripts/session-reaper.cjs [--monitor http://100.77.138.14:3100] [--json]Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addressscripts/session-reaper.cjs:15 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot name* node scripts/session-reaper.cjs [--monitor http://100.77.138.14:3100] [--json]Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/release.js:229 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst nextEnv = { ...env };Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/setup-test-dbs.sh:39 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges|| sudo -u postgres createdb -O "${PG_USER}" "${PG_DB}"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/test-db-adapters.sh:14 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# (see ~/.ssh/config; the restricted dbtunnel account is enough)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addressscripts/session-reaper.cjs:18 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot nameconst DEFAULT_MONITOR = process.env.DEVWF_MONITOR_URL || 'http://100.77.138.14:3100';Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/setup-test-dbs.sh:26 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo -u postgres psql -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 <<SQLFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsecurity/http.js:6 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesres.json=value=>json(securityOutputFilter(value));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/verify-push-branch.mjs:90 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log("\n=== output tool ===");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsecurity/http.js:12 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesres.status(422).json({error:'Knowledge input rejected; use SecretReference.',findings:error.findings || []});Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/test-db-adapters.sh:36 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill "$TUNNEL_PID" 2> /dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/test-db-adapters.sh:35 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif [ -n "${TUNNEL_PID:-}" ] && kill -0 "$TUNNEL_PID" 2> /dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,157 tok
2 files · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim programinglive: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  5. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. HTTP URL with a raw public IP address≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim programinglivePropose a patch to the maintainer