dev-workflow-mcp-server@1.29.2
CAUTION· startup onlyPublisher claims: "MCP server to enforce development workflow discipline" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
ADMIN_PASSWORDDATABASE_URLDEVWF_MONITOR_TOKENSENTRY_ACCESS_TOKENSENTRY_AUTH_TOKENZETTLY_API_TOKENZETTLY_CLI_TOKENZETTLY_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: ADMIN_EMAIL, ADMIN_USERNAME, DEFAULT_PRD_DISPLAY_PATH, DEV_WORKFLOW_DB_PATH, DEV_WORKFLOW_DB_TYPE, DEV_WORKFLOW_STATE_FILE, DEVWF_AGENT, DEVWF_LOCAL_URL, DEVWF_MACHINE, DEVWF_MONITOR_ENV_FILE, DEVWF_MONITOR_HEARTBEAT_MS, DEVWF_MONITOR_URL, DEVWF_RELEASE_REVISION, DEVWF_RELEASE_VERSION, DEVWF_SENTRY_CONFIG, DEVWF_STATE_ROOT, DEVWF_ZETTLY_ALLOW_LEGACY_CONFIG, DEVWF_ZETTLY_CONFIG, DEVWF_ZETTLY_SYNC, GITHUB_REF_NAME, INIT_CWD, NODE_TEST_CONTEXT, ProgramFiles, PROJECT_DIR, SENTRY_HOST, SENTRY_ORG, WORKFLOW_PROJECT_DIR, ZETTLY_API_BASE, ZETTLY_CONFIG, ZETTLY_EXPECTED_USER_ID, ZETTLY_URL- Where it talks to
- programinglive.com (its own)Also githubusercontent.com, google.com, docker.com, opencode.ai, evil.example — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names githubusercontent.com, google.com, docker.com, opencode.ai, evil.example as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ADMIN_PASSWORD, DATABASE_URL, DEVWF_MONITOR_TOKEN, SENTRY_ACCESS_TOKEN, SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN, ZETTLY_API_TOKEN, ZETTLY_CLI_TOKEN, ZETTLY_TOKEN only into requests to programinglive.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; HTTP URL with a raw public IP address; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 32 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
brew install rtk || curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rtk-ai/rtk/refs/heads/master/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.* our devices and central gateway (`http://100.77.138.14:3200/sse`).Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/docker-composeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.N=$(sudo -u postgres psql -d devwf_monitor -tAc "SELECT count(*) FROM sessions WHERE session_key='$KEY';" | tr -d ' ')Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.curl -sS -H 'x-devwf-share: 1' 'http://100.77.138.14:3100/api/share?all=1' \Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.sudo -u postgres psql -d devwf_monitor -tAc \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.|| sudo -u postgres createdb -O "${PG_USER}" "${PG_DB}"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.const nextEnv = { ...env };Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.sudo -u postgres createdb -O "${PG_USER}" "${PG_DB}"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.endpoint: "http://100.77.138.14:3200/sse -> PocketBase (100.77.138.14:8090)",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.Q() { sudo -u postgres psql -d devwf_monitor -tAc "$1" | tr -d ' '; }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Q() { sudo -u postgres psql -d devwf_monitor -tAc "$1"; }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo -u postgres psql -d devwf_monitor -tAc "DELETE FROM sessions WHERE session_key='rotasi-uji';" >/dev/null 2>&1Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Q() { sudo -u postgres psql -d devwf_monitor -tAc "$1" | tr -d ' '; }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo -u postgres psql -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 <<SQLFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Q() { sudo -u postgres psql -d devwf_monitor -tAc "$1" | tr -d ' '; }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo curl -L "https://github.com/docker/compose/releases/latest/download/docker-compose-$(uname -s)-$(uname -m)" -o /usr/local/bin/docker-composeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.endpoint: "Local MCP + http://100.77.138.14:3200/sse",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.sudo -u postgres psql -d "${PG_DB}" -c "ALTER SCHEMA public OWNER TO ${PG_USER};" >/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo -u postgres psql -d devwf_monitor -tAc "DELETE FROM sessions WHERE session_key='rotasi-uji';" >/dev/null 2>&1Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.endpoint: "Built into dev-workflow + http://100.77.138.14:3200/sse -> Factory (100.77.138.14:3000)",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.sudo sh get-docker.shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo usermod -aG docker $USERFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Q() { sudo -u postgres psql -d devwf_monitor -tAc "$1" | tr -d ' '; }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# Run this on bw-server (it uses sudo locally). It creates:Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Q() { sudo -u postgres psql -d devwf_monitor -tAc "$1" | tr -d ' '; }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo -u postgres psql -d devwf_monitor -tAc "DELETE FROM sessions WHERE session_key='rotasi-uji';" >/dev/null 2>&1Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.curl -sS -X DELETE "http://100.77.138.14:3100/api/share?token=$TOKEN" -H 'x-devwf-share: 1'Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.http://100.77.138.14:3100/api/sessionFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.Q() { sudo -u postgres psql -d devwf_monitor -tAc "$1"; }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo -u postgres psql -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 >/dev/null <<SQLFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.echo "⚠️ Please update the passwords in .env before production use!"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Q() { sudo -u postgres psql -d devwf_monitor -tAc "$1"; }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.BASE=http://100.77.138.14:3100Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.if ! sudo -u postgres psql -tAc "SELECT 1 FROM pg_database WHERE datname='${PG_DB}'" | grep -q 1; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.echo "⚠️ Created .env file from template"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.const nextEnv = { ...env };Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.brew install rtk || curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rtk-ai/rtk/refs/heads/master/install.sh | shFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.if [ ! -f .env ]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.sudo -u postgres psql -tAc "SELECT 1 FROM pg_database WHERE datname='${PG_DB}'" | grep -q 1 \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Q() { sudo -u postgres psql -d devwf_monitor -tAc "$1"; }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.BASE=http://100.77.138.14:3100Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.sudo -u postgres psql -d "${PG_DB}" -c "GRANT ALL ON SCHEMA public TO ${PG_USER};" > /dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# (see ~/.ssh/config; the restricted dbtunnel account is enough)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.BASE=http://100.77.138.14:3100Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.cp .env.production .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.endpoint: "http://100.77.138.14:3200/sse -> Notification Hub (100.77.138.14:3099)",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.sudo -u postgres psql -d devwf_monitor -tAc \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.BASE=http://100.77.138.14:3100Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.BASE=http://100.77.138.14:3100Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.curl -sS http://100.77.138.14:3100/api/sessions -o /tmp/sesi.jsonFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.if(token){const config=readZettlyConfig({...env,ZETTLY_API_BASE:base,ZETTLY_API_TOKEN:token});return config?{...config,source:'windows-dpapi',expectedUserId}:null;}Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.curl -sS -X DELETE "http://100.77.138.14:3100/api/share?token=$TOKEN" -H 'x-devwf-share: 1'Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.cek "OPTIONS origin sah" 204 "$(curl -sS -m 10 -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -X OPTIONS $BASE/api/share -H 'x-devwf-share: 1' -H 'origin: http://100.77.138.14:3100')"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.BASE=http://100.77.138.14:3100Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.BASE=http://100.77.138.14:3100Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/docker-composeFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.endpoint: "http://100.77.138.14:3200/sse -> Notification Hub (100.77.138.14:3099)",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.chmod 600 "$ENVF.new"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chmod 600 "$ENVF.new"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.brew install rtk || curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rtk-ai/rtk/refs/heads/master/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.endpoint: "Local MCP + http://100.77.138.14:3200/sse",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.res.status(422).json({error:'Knowledge input rejected; use SecretReference.',findings:error.findings || []});Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.chmod 600 "$ENVF.new"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.endpoint: "http://100.77.138.14:3200/sse -> PocketBase (100.77.138.14:8090)",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.curl -sS http://100.77.138.14:3100/api/sessions -o /tmp/sesi.jsonFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.* our devices and central gateway (`http://100.77.138.14:3200/sse`).Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.curl -sS -X POST http://100.77.138.14:3100/api/share \Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.curl -sS -X POST http://100.77.138.14:3100/api/share \Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.http://100.77.138.14:3100/api/sessionFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.console.log("\n=== output tool ===");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.kill "$TUNNEL_PID" 2> /dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if (prior && aktif) console.log(" -> akan ditolak sebelum POST /api/work");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.res.json=value=>json(securityOutputFilter(value));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.const config=token&&readZettlyConfig({...env,ZETTLY_API_BASE:base,ZETTLY_API_TOKEN:token});Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.if [ -n "${TUNNEL_PID:-}" ] && kill -0 "$TUNNEL_PID" 2> /dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.BASE=http://100.77.138.14:3100Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.chown -R node:node /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.endpoint: "Built into dev-workflow + http://100.77.138.14:3200/sse -> Factory (100.77.138.14:3000)",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.cek "OPTIONS origin sah" 204 "$(curl -sS -m 10 -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -X OPTIONS $BASE/api/share -H 'x-devwf-share: 1' -H 'origin: http://100.77.138.14:3100')"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.curl -sS -H 'x-devwf-share: 1' 'http://100.77.138.14:3100/api/share?all=1' \Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @programinglive/dev-workflow-mcp-server@1.29.2 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim programinglive: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- HTTP URL with a raw public IP address≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.