Skills/npm/dev-workflow-mcp-server

dev-workflow-mcp-server@1.32.0

CAUTION· startup only

Publisher claims: "MCP server to enforce development workflow discipline" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher programinglive · publishing for 394 daysInstalls 24,334Last detonated 28 min ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ADMIN_PASSWORDCF_ACCESS_CLIENT_SECRETDATABASE_URLDEVWF_MONITOR_TOKENDEVWF_REAPER_SECRETDEVWF_REAPER_SECRETSFACTORY_PASSWORDFACTORY_TOKENSENTRY_ACCESS_TOKENSENTRY_AUTH_TOKENZETTLY_API_TOKENZETTLY_CLI_TOKENZETTLY_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: ADMIN_EMAIL, ADMIN_USERNAME, CF_ACCESS_CLIENT_ID, CLIENT_SESSION_ID, CLIENT_SESSION_TITLE, DEFAULT_PRD_DISPLAY_PATH, DEV_WORKFLOW_DB_PATH, DEV_WORKFLOW_DB_TYPE, DEV_WORKFLOW_SECURITY_MODE, DEV_WORKFLOW_STATE_FILE, DEVWF_ACQUIRE_SEQ_DIR, DEVWF_AGENT, DEVWF_FLEET_LOCAL_ONLY, DEVWF_LOCAL_URL, DEVWF_MACHINE, DEVWF_MANAGED_CACHE, DEVWF_MONITOR_ENV_FILE, DEVWF_MONITOR_HEARTBEAT_MS, DEVWF_MONITOR_URL, DEVWF_PROFILE_DIR, DEVWF_PUBLIC_LOCAL_FIRST, DEVWF_REAPER_DRY_RUN, DEVWF_RELEASE_REVISION, DEVWF_RELEASE_URL, DEVWF_RELEASE_VERSION, DEVWF_SENTRY_CONFIG, DEVWF_SKIP_ZETTLY
Where it talks to
programinglive.com (its own)Also githubusercontent.com, opencode.ai, monitor-host.example — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names githubusercontent.com, opencode.ai, monitor-host.example as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ADMIN_PASSWORD, CF_ACCESS_CLIENT_SECRET, DATABASE_URL, DEVWF_MONITOR_TOKEN, DEVWF_REAPER_SECRET, DEVWF_REAPER_SECRETS, FACTORY_PASSWORD, FACTORY_TOKEN, SENTRY_ACCESS_TOKEN, SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN, ZETTLY_API_TOKEN, ZETTLY_CLI_TOKEN, ZETTLY_TOKEN only into requests to programinglive.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets ADMIN_PASSWORD=programinglive.com,CF_ACCESS_CLIENT_SECRET=programinglive.com,DATABASE_URL=programinglive.com,DEVWF_MONITOR_TOKEN=programinglive.com,DEVWF_REAPER_SECRET=programinglive.com,DEVWF_REAPER_SECRETS=programinglive.com,FACTORY_PASSWORD=programinglive.com,FACTORY_TOKEN=programinglive.com,SENTRY_ACCESS_TOKEN=programinglive.com,SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN=programinglive.com,ZETTLY_API_TOKEN=programinglive.com,ZETTLY_CLI_TOKEN=programinglive.com,ZETTLY_TOKEN=programinglive.com -- npx -y @programinglive/dev-workflow-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 40 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.1sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
0.1sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.3sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
19sprocessdependency install exit 0
39sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · code: 'ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND', url: 'file:///tmp/ks-detonate-lttHEr/task/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/dev-workflow-mcp-server/security/sanitizer.js' } Node.js v22.23.5
39sprocessscript backend runs setup only
39sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
39sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5
39sprocessexited 1: Node.js v22.23.5

Static findings

HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/setup-test-dbs.sh:26 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo -u postgres psql -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 <<SQLFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLscripts/bootstrap-unix.sh:32 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourcebrew install rtk || curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rtk-ai/rtk/refs/heads/master/install.sh | shFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathszettly-client.js:85 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif(token){const config=readZettlyConfig({...env,ZETTLY_API_BASE:base,ZETTLY_API_TOKEN:token});return config?{...config,source:'windows-dpapi',expectedUserId}:null;}Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/check-review-guard.mjs:31 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesif (prior && aktif) console.log(" -> akan ditolak sebelum POST /api/work");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathszettly-client.js:78 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst config=readZettlyConfig({...env,ZETTLY_API_BASE:profileBase,ZETTLY_API_TOKEN:creds.token});Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/setup-test-dbs.sh:5 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges# Run this on bw-server (it uses sudo locally). It creates:Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addressscripts/session-reaper.cjs:15 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filtering* node scripts/session-reaper.cjs [--monitor http://100.77.138.14:3100] [--json]Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addressscripts/session-reaper.cjs:18 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot nameconst DEFAULT_MONITOR = process.env.DEVWF_MONITOR_URL || 'http://100.77.138.14:3100';Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/test-db-adapters.sh:35 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif [ -n "${TUNNEL_PID:-}" ] && kill -0 "$TUNNEL_PID" 2> /dev/null; thenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/share-growth.sh:5 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesQ() { sudo -u postgres psql -d devwf_monitor -tAc "$1"; }Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathszettly-client.js:95 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst config=token&&readZettlyConfig({...env,ZETTLY_API_BASE:base,ZETTLY_API_TOKEN:token});Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/release.cjs:383 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst nextEnv = { ...env };Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:20 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschown -R node:node /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsecurity/http.js:12 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesres.status(422).json({error:'Knowledge input rejected; use SecretReference.',findings:error.findings || []});Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addressscripts/session-reaper.cjs:15 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot name* node scripts/session-reaper.cjs [--monitor http://100.77.138.14:3100] [--json]Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/setup-test-dbs.sh:38 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo -u postgres psql -tAc "SELECT 1 FROM pg_database WHERE datname='${PG_DB}'" | grep -q 1 \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/test-db-adapters.sh:36 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeskill "$TUNNEL_PID" 2> /dev/null || trueFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/setup-test-dbs.sh:41 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegessudo -u postgres psql -d "${PG_DB}" -c "GRANT ALL ON SCHEMA public TO ${PG_USER};" > /dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addressscripts/session-reaper.cjs:18 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringconst DEFAULT_MONITOR = process.env.DEVWF_MONITOR_URL || 'http://100.77.138.14:3100';Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/release.js:229 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst nextEnv = { ...env };Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/bootstrap-unix.sh:32 · Remote installer piped to shellbrew install rtk || curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rtk-ai/rtk/refs/heads/master/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsecurity/http.js:6 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesres.json=value=>json(securityOutputFilter(value));Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/verify-push-branch.mjs:90 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log("\n=== output tool ===");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/bootstrap-unix.sh:32 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codebrew install rtk || curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/rtk-ai/rtk/refs/heads/master/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/setup-test-dbs.sh:39 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges|| sudo -u postgres createdb -O "${PG_USER}" "${PG_DB}"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/test-db-adapters.sh:14 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# (see ~/.ssh/config; the restricted dbtunnel account is enough)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈3,157 tok
2 files · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim programinglive: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  5. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. HTTP URL with a raw public IP address≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim programinglivePropose a patch to the maintainer