gitwhy@0.1.2
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Enables AI assistants to inspect a Git repository read-only and get a plain-English diagnosis of what state it is in, along with the exact commands to fix it. It also explains pasted Git error messages and can return a neutral summary of branch, upstream, staged and changed files, without ever modifying the repository." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso git-scm.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 65/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected; References a credential file in the home directory; Destructive file system command detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
n, e = _read_text(rm / "msgnum"), _read_text(rm / "end")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."Copy the contents of the .pub file it created (~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub) into GitHub > Settings > SSH and GPG keys."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.p = subprocess.run(["git", *args], cwd=str(cwd), env=e, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.st.rebase_onto = _read_text(rm / "onto")[:9]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.assert ".env " in items + " " and "keys/id_rsa" in itemsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.p = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "whygit", "--path", str(path)], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.URL = f"https://student:{TOKEN}@github.com/student/hw1.git"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."Copy the contents of the .pub file it created (~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub) into GitHub > Settings > SSH and GPG keys."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.f"sudo chown -R $(whoami) {q(path)}",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.st.rebase_edit_stop = (rm / "amend").exists()Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.assert ".env.example" not in itemsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."Run your command again and, when Git asks for a password, paste the token (it won't show as you type)."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.".netrc",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.sb.git(repo, "add", ".env", ".env.example", "keys/id_rsa")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.sb.write(repo, {".env": "API_KEY=abc\n", ".env.example": "API_KEY=\n", "keys/id_rsa": "-----BEGIN-----\n"})Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.return real(cmd, *a, **kw)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.st.rebase_head_name = _read_text(rm / "head-name").replace("refs/heads/", "")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."Files like .env, private keys (.pem, id_rsa) and credentials JSON usually hold secrets. Once pushed to "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.if name.startswith(".env.") and not name.endswith(SAFE_ENV_SUFFIXES):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.f"sudo chown -R $(whoami) {q(path)}",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
15 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim srikarmk: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.