Skills/PyPI/mysql-mcp-server

mysql-mcp-server@0.4.5

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that enables secure interaction with MySQL databases. This server allows AI assistants to list tables, read data, and execute SQL queries through a controlled interface, making database exploration and analysis safer and more structured." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher designcomputer · publishing for 711 daysInstalls 30,492Last detonated 37 h ago
$claude mcp add mysql-mcp-server -- uvx mysql-mcp-server
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MYSQL_AUTH_PLUGINMYSQL_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_SSE_ALLOWED_HOSTS, MCP_SSE_HOST, MCP_SSE_PORT, MCP_TRANSPORT, MYSQL_CHARSET, MYSQL_COLLATION, MYSQL_CONNECT_TIMEOUT, MYSQL_DATABASE, MYSQL_HOST, MYSQL_LOCAL_PORT, MYSQL_PORT, MYSQL_RAISE_ON_WARNINGS, MYSQL_SQL_MODE, MYSQL_SSH_ENABLE, MYSQL_SSH_HOST, MYSQL_SSH_KEY_PATH, MYSQL_SSH_PORT, MYSQL_SSH_REMOTE_HOST, MYSQL_SSH_REMOTE_PORT, MYSQL_SSH_USER, MYSQL_SSL_CA, MYSQL_SSL_MODE, MYSQL_USE_PURE, MYSQL_USER
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for MYSQL_AUTH_PLUGIN, MYSQL_PASSWORD and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mysql-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/mysql_mcp_server/server.py:593 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networklogger.error("SSE transport requires additional dependencies. Install with: pip install mysql_mcp_server[sse]")Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Credential pass-through configurationDockerfile:23 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials# Pass secrets at runtime via `docker run -e MYSQL_PASSWORD=...`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:19 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsRUN useradd -m -u 1000 appuser && chown -R appuser:appuser /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mysql_mcp_server/server.py:23 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load environment variables from .env file if it exists.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/mysql_mcp_server/server.py:96 · Python subprocess execution detectedssh_proc = subprocess.Popen(ssh_cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
Fake instruction boundary tagREADME.md:126 · Fake instruction boundary tag · informational: not an instruction file…aunch on demand. In Claude Code they appear as slash commands (`/mcp__<server>__<prompt>`); in Claude Desktop they appear in the prompts (`+`) menu. | Prompt | Argumen…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈107 tok
1 file · 23 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mysql-mcp-server@0.4.5 as of 37 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.