Skills/Glama/gitwhy

gitwhy@0.1.2

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Enables AI assistants to inspect a Git repository read-only and get a plain-English diagnosis of what state it is in, along with the exact commands to fix it. It also explains pasted Git error messages and can return a neutral summary of branch, upstream, staged and changed files, without ever modifying the repository." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry GlamaPublisher srikarmk · publishing for 5 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 29 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso git-scm.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- <the server's command>

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 65/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected; References a credential file in the home directory; Destructive file system command detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedsrc/whygit/state.py:272 · Destructive file system command detectedn, e = _read_text(rm / "msgnum"), _read_text(rm / "end")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/whygit/gitcmd.py:139 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorysrc/whygit/errors.py:157 · References a credential file in the home directory"Copy the contents of the .pub file it created (~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub) into GitHub > Settings > SSH and GPG keys."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/scenarios.py:53 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.run(["git", *args], cwd=str(cwd), env=e, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedsrc/whygit/state.py:271 · Destructive file system command detectedst.rebase_onto = _read_text(rm / "onto")[:9]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_rules.py:153 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert ".env " in items + " " and "keys/id_rsa" in itemsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_cli.py:71 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "whygit", "--path", str(path)], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_redaction.py:8 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingURL = f"https://student:{TOKEN}@github.com/student/hw1.git"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/whygit/errors.py:157 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"Copy the contents of the .pub file it created (~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub) into GitHub > Settings > SSH and GPG keys."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/whygit/rules.py:118 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsf"sudo chown -R $(whoami) {q(path)}",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedsrc/whygit/state.py:274 · Destructive file system command detectedst.rebase_edit_stop = (rm / "amend").exists()Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_rules.py:154 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert ".env.example" not in itemsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialssrc/whygit/errors.py:107 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineering"Run your command again and, when Git asks for a password, paste the token (it won't show as you type)."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/whygit/state.py:402 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".netrc",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/whygit/state.py:395 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/scenarios.py:383 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filessb.git(repo, "add", ".env", ".env.example", "keys/id_rsa")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/scenarios.py:382 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filessb.write(repo, {".env": "API_KEY=abc\n", ".env.example": "API_KEY=\n", "keys/id_rsa": "-----BEGIN-----\n"})Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_readonly.py:243 · Python subprocess execution detected (subprocess.run via from)return real(cmd, *a, **kw)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedsrc/whygit/state.py:270 · Destructive file system command detectedst.rebase_head_name = _read_text(rm / "head-name").replace("refs/heads/", "")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/whygit/rules.py:1209 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"Files like .env, private keys (.pem, id_rsa) and credentials JSON usually hold secrets. Once pushed to "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/whygit/state.py:415 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif name.startswith(".env.") and not name.endswith(SAFE_ENV_SUFFIXES):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/whygit/rules.py:118 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesf"sudo chown -R $(whoami) {q(path)}",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈31 tok
1 file · 28 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

15 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim srikarmk: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
Publish a new version to Glama, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim srikarmkPropose a patch to the maintainer