Skills/ClawHub/gitlab-skill

gitlab-skill@1.0.1

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "GitLab operations including creating and cloning repositories, listing projects, managing issues, merge requests, branches, commits, and pipelines. Use this..." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher pickbert · publishing for 230 daysInstalls 856Last detonated 2 h ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
4 of 4 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: URL with embedded credentials; URL with embedded credentials; Credential pass-through configuration. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 1:
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessexited 1:
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.6sprocessexited 2: gitlab_api.py: error: the following arguments are required: operation
0.6sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.8sprocessexited 1:
0.8sprocess4 of 4 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.8sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.8sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.8sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsscripts/gitlab_api.py:158 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking# Format: https://oauth2:TOKEN@host/project.gitFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsscripts/gitlab_api.py:160 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingauth_url = repo_url.replace('https://', f'https://oauth2:{self.token}@')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationscripts/credential_loader.py:207 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsimport getpassFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/fetch_repos.py:48 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/gitlab_api.py:165 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsSKILL.md:267 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking**Authentication note:** For private repos requiring HTTPS auth, embed token in URL: `https://oauth2:TOKEN@host/project.git`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/gitlab_api.py:212 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/gitlab_api.py:267 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/credential_loader.py:323 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsprint(" Then run: chmod 600 " + str(config_path))Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:181 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 ~/.claude/gitlab_config.jsonFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/gitlab_api.py:222 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:103 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions✅ Restrict file permissions: `chmod 600 ~/.claude/gitlab_config.json`Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/gitlab_api.py:202 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandSKILL.md:57 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod 600 ~/.claude/gitlab_config.json # Restrict file permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,226 tok
1 file · 9 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim pickbert: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
Publish a new version to ClawHub, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim pickbertPropose a patch to the maintainer