Propose a patch
A fix the maintainer can act on, with the evidence attached. It opens under your GitHub account in your browser; KillerSkills holds no token and never modifies the package. The fix is verified the only way we verify anything: the next crawl re-runs the new version in the honeypot. 77 · Caution
Evidence
The sandbox observed nothing beyond the static findings; the proposal cites those.
Diff · removes 4 caught lines
Download .patchdiff --git a/scripts/gitlab_api.py b/scripts/gitlab_api.py
--- a/scripts/gitlab_api.py
+++ b/scripts/gitlab_api.py
@@ -158,1 +158,0 @@
-# Format: https://oauth2:TOKEN@host/project.git
@@ -160,1 +159,0 @@
-auth_url = repo_url.replace('https://', f'https://oauth2:{self.token}@')
diff --git a/scripts/credential_loader.py b/scripts/credential_loader.py
--- a/scripts/credential_loader.py
+++ b/scripts/credential_loader.py
@@ -207,1 +207,0 @@
-import getpass
diff --git a/SKILL.md b/SKILL.md
--- a/SKILL.md
+++ b/SKILL.md
@@ -267,1 +267,0 @@
-**Authentication note:** For private repos requiring HTTPS auth, embed token in URL: `https://oauth2:TOKEN@host/project.git`
Zero-context hunks: apply with git apply --unidiff-zero fix.patch on the tagged source of 1.0.1. If the behavior is intended, declare it (host under permissions.network, a line in the README) instead of removing it; the next crawl scores declarations.
Issue / PR body
Title: gitlab-skill: URL with embedded credentials (KillerSkills verdict caution 77)
## What the honeypot observed KillerSkills ran **[email protected]** in an isolated sandbox (decoy credentials, recording proxy, syscall trace; engine 1.9.2) and scored it **CAUTION 77/100**. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory. - See the findings below. Full trace and findings: https://killerskills.ai/skills/clawhub/gitlab-skill/1.0.1 ## Findings with a location - `scripts/gitlab_api.py:158` · URL with embedded credentials — scripts/gitlab_api.py:158 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking - `scripts/gitlab_api.py:160` · URL with embedded credentials — scripts/gitlab_api.py:160 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking - `scripts/credential_loader.py:207` · Credential pass-through configuration — scripts/credential_loader.py:207 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials - `SKILL.md:267` · URL with embedded credentials — SKILL.md:267 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking ## Proposed change The attached patch removes the 4 lines above. If the behavior is intended, the fix is to declare it instead: list the host under `permissions.network` (or the MCP manifest) and say in the README why the package needs it; the next crawl will re-score it with the declaration taken into account. ## How this will be verified Nothing is "verified safe" by assertion. When a new version is published, KillerSkills re-runs it in the honeypot and the verdict page updates; you can trigger it early from the verdict page ("Re-scan after I publish a fix"). Reply here or at [email protected] if you believe the verdict is wrong; disputes are reviewed by a person and the outcome is published on the verdict page. _Proposed through killerskills.ai/threats by a user of the package, under their own GitHub account. The evidence is public; the package was never modified by KillerSkills._
We count proposals opened, not merged: a merge shows up as a new version that the crawl re-runs. Disputes: the maintainer can contest the verdict from its page; a person reviews it and the outcome is published.