git@1.0.12

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Commits, branches, merges, and rebases Git repositories, resolves conflicts, and recovers lost history. Use when the work touches a repo, commit, branch, merge, rebase, stash, tag, or submodule; when Git refuses a command — index.lock exists, push rejected as non-fast-forward, detached HEAD, dubious ownership, unrelated histories, conflict markers left behind; when something looks lost after a hard reset, a bad rebase, a deleted branch, or a dropped stash; when splitting a mixed change, wording commit messages, cleaning history before review, or force-pushing without wrecking a teammate's work; when a credential or a huge file got committed; when setting up worktrees, hooks, LFS, sparse checkout, signing, or separate work and personal identities. Not for CI pipeline YAML (github-actions, gitlab) or for composing the pull request description itself (pull-request)." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher ivangdavila · publishing for 273 daysInstalls 18,925Last detonated 46 h ago
$clawhub install git
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 91/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsSKILL.md:164 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files| `git clean -fdx` to "clean build artifacts" | `-x` also deletes ignored files: `.env`, IDE config, local secrets | `git clean -fd`, always preview with `-n` |Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

No other findings across 1,539 lines in 22 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,508 tok
1 file · 22 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.