dcg-guard@1.1.0
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Hard-blocks dangerous shell commands (rm -rf, git push --force, etc.) before execution via OpenClaw's before_tool_call plugin hook. Zero noise on safe comman..." Observed in sandbox: calls raw.githubusercontent.com only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected; Pipe-to-shell pattern; Destructive file system command detected. Summary: calls raw.githubusercontent.com only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenariosStatic findings
// === CRITICAL: Format / disk operations ===Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.curl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dicklesworthstone/destructive_command_guard/master/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.**Blocked (Windows):** `Remove-Item -Recurse -Force`, `rd /s /q`, `del /s`, `Format-Volume`, `reg delete HKLM`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Add to your workspace `AGENTS.md`:Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.curl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dicklesworthstone/destructive_command_guard/master/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.{ pattern: /del\s+\/s/i, id: "win.fs:del-recursive", severity: "critical", reason: "Recursive deletion via del /s" },Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.curl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dicklesworthstone/destructive_command_guard/master/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.{ id: "win.fs:del-recursive", severity: "critical", reason: "Recursive deletion via del /s",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.curl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dicklesworthstone/destructive_command_guard/master/install.sh | bashFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.## Add to AGENTS.md / SOUL.mdFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.curl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dicklesworthstone/destructive_command_guard/master/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.if (lower.includes("del /s")) {Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.curl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dicklesworthstone/destructive_command_guard/master/install.sh | bashFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.
What would make this Verified
8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim starensen: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.