Skills/ClawHub/dcg-guard

dcg-guard@1.1.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Hard-blocks dangerous shell commands (rm -rf, git push --force, etc.) before execution via OpenClaw's before_tool_call plugin hook. Zero noise on safe comman..." Observed in sandbox: calls raw.githubusercontent.com only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry ClawHubPublisher starensen · publishing for 271 daysInstalls 2,015Last detonated 16 min ago

Coverage

Install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; install scripts ran; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected; Pipe-to-shell pattern; Destructive file system command detected. Summary: calls raw.githubusercontent.com only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.0snetworkCONNECT tcp://raw.githubusercontent.com:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.0sprocessexited 56: curl: (56) CONNECT tunnel failed, response 403
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.1snetworkCONNECT tcp://raw.githubusercontent.com:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.1sprocessexited 56: curl: (56) CONNECT tunnel failed, response 403

Static findings

HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedindex-windows-hybrid.ts:33 · Destructive file system command detected// === CRITICAL: Format / disk operations ===Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Pipe-to-shell patternSKILL.md:45 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dicklesworthstone/destructive_command_guard/master/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedSKILL.md:31 · Destructive file system command detected**Blocked (Windows):** `Remove-Item -Recurse -Force`, `rd /s /q`, `del /s`, `Format-Volume`, `reg delete HKLM`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesSKILL.md:86 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesAdd to your workspace `AGENTS.md`:Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellinstall.sh:9 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dicklesworthstone/destructive_command_guard/master/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedindex-windows-hybrid.ts:28 · Destructive file system command detected{ pattern: /del\s+\/s/i, id: "win.fs:del-recursive", severity: "critical", reason: "Recursive deletion via del /s" },Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patterninstall.sh:9 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dicklesworthstone/destructive_command_guard/master/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedindex.ts:43 · Destructive file system command detected{ id: "win.fs:del-recursive", severity: "critical", reason: "Recursive deletion via del /s",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLinstall.sh:9 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourcecurl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dicklesworthstone/destructive_command_guard/master/install.sh | bashFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesAGENT_INSTRUCTIONS.md:64 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction file## Add to AGENTS.md / SOUL.mdFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellSKILL.md:45 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dicklesworthstone/destructive_command_guard/master/install.sh | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedindex-windows-hybrid.ts:127 · Destructive file system command detectedif (lower.includes("del /s")) {Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLSKILL.md:45 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourcecurl -sSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Dicklesworthstone/destructive_command_guard/master/install.sh | bashFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈805 tok
1 file · 8 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.

What would make this Verified

8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim starensen: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  5. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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