whoop-mcp-server@0.0.12
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Ask Claude or ChatGPT about your WHOOP data. Recovery, sleep, strain, and workout analysis computed from your own records." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- whoop.com (its own)
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable and talks to whoop.com, its own; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.sys.exit(subprocess.run(["uvx", "whoop-mcp-server", "serve"]).returncode)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.<summary><b>ChatGPT setup</b></summary> ChatGPT connects to remote MCP servers, so expose the HTTP transport and tunnel it: ```bash whoop-mcp-server serve --traFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct."""Build Settings from the environment plus optional .env / config.json files."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.3. A ``.env`` file in the data directory (``~/.whoop-mcp`` by default)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(command, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.2. A ``.env`` file in the current working directoryFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.npx -y @anthropic-ai/mcpb validate mcpb/manifest.jsonFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.merge(_read_env_file(Path.cwd() / ".env"))Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.subprocess.run(["osascript", "-e", 'quit app "Claude"'], capture_output=True, timeout=15)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(["pgrep", "-x", "Claude"], capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."""Parse a minimal ``KEY=VALUE`` .env file. Quotes and comments are handled."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.The interactive flow (``whoop-mcp-server auth``) spins up a tiny localhost HTTPFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.Then in ChatGPT: Settings, Apps & Connectors, Advanced settings, enable Developer mode, create a connector with `https://<your-tunnel>/mcp` and no auth.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.workouts.csv. Nothing is uploaded anywhere. Returns the file paths andFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.npx -y @anthropic-ai/mcpb pack mcpb bundle/whoop-mcp-server.mcpbFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Then in ChatGPT: Settings, Apps & Connectors, Advanced settings, enable Developer mode, create a connector with `https://<your-tunnel>/mcp` and no auth.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Then in ChatGPT: Settings, Apps & Connectors, Advanced settings, enable Developer mode, create a connector with `https://<your-tunnel>/mcp` and no auth.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for whoop-mcp-server@0.0.12 as of 1 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim rajdeepmondaldotcom: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.