wayland-mcp-kurojs@0.6.1
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Model Context Protocol server for Wayland desktop automation with VLM analysis, mouse/keyboard control, and action chaining" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso openrouter.ai, kernel.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Destructive file system command detected; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
# sudo rm -f /etc/udev/rules.d/99-input.rules /etc/sudoers.d/evemu-eventFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# sudo rm -f /etc/udev/rules.d/99-input.rules /etc/sudoers.d/evemu-eventFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# sudo udevadm control --reload-rules && sudo udevadm triggerFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# sudo chmod u-s /usr/bin/evemu-eventFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# sudo gpasswd -d "$USER" input # optional, if you do not want the membershipFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=20, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.out = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.out = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=20, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# 2. /etc/sudoers.d/evemu-event, NOPASSWD # passwordless root for the sameFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# 4. chmod 666 /dev/input/event* # every input device world-writableFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.# 1. chmod u+s /usr/bin/evemu-event # setuid root on an input injectorFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# sudo chmod u-s /usr/bin/evemu-eventFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# sudo rm -f /etc/udev/rules.d/99-input.rules /etc/sudoers.d/evemu-eventFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.desc = subprocess.check_output(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for wayland-mcp-kurojs@0.6.1 as of 30 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim kurojs: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.