voice-mode@9.0.2
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "VoiceMode - Voice interaction capabilities for AI assistants (formerly voice-mcp)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
CARTESIA_API_KEYOPENAI_API_KEYVOICEMODE_MCP_TOKENVOICEMODE_SERVE_SECRETVOICEMODE_SERVE_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: CLAUDE_CODE_AGENT, CLAUDE_CODE_SESSION_ID, CLAUDE_SESSION_ID, TMUX, TMUX_PANE, VOICE_MODE_AUTO_START_KOKORO, VOICEMODE_AAC_BITRATE, VOICEMODE_AGENT, VOICEMODE_ALWAYS_TRY_LOCAL, VOICEMODE_AUDIO_FEEDBACK, VOICEMODE_AUDIO_FORMAT, VOICEMODE_AUTO_START_KOKORO, VOICEMODE_BASE_DIR, VOICEMODE_CARTESIA_FALLBACK_MODEL, VOICEMODE_CARTESIA_MODEL, VOICEMODE_CARTESIA_VOICE_ID, VOICEMODE_CHIME_LEADING_SILENCE, VOICEMODE_CHIME_TRAILING_SILENCE, VOICEMODE_CONCH_CHECK_INTERVAL, VOICEMODE_CONCH_ENABLED, VOICEMODE_CONCH_GRANT_TTL, VOICEMODE_CONCH_HOLD_EXPIRY, VOICEMODE_CONCH_LOCK_EXPIRY, VOICEMODE_CONCH_MCP_WAIT_CAP, VOICEMODE_CONCH_REMOTE_TTL, VOICEMODE_CONCH_TIMEOUT, VOICEMODE_CONTROL_PAUSE_TIMEOUT, VOICEMODE_CONTROL_PAUSE_TIMEOUT_ACTION, VOICEMODE_CONTROL_SOCKET, VOICEMODE_DEBUG, VOICEMODE_DEFAULT_LISTEN_DURATION, VOICEMODE_DISABLE_SILENCE_DETECTION, VOICEMODE_DJ_DUCK_AMOUNT, VOICEMODE_DJ_VOLUME, VOICEMODE_EVENT_LOG_DIR- Where it talks to
- voicemode.dev (its own)Also cartesia.ai, musicforprogramming.net, githubusercontent.com, mpv.io, evil.example — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names cartesia.ai, musicforprogramming.net, githubusercontent.com, mpv.io, evil.example as well as its own vendor. The guard injects CARTESIA_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY, VOICEMODE_MCP_TOKEN, VOICEMODE_SERVE_SECRET, VOICEMODE_SERVE_TOKEN only into requests to voicemode.dev (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
install_command: curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."**/.env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Strip surrounding quotes if present (from .env file parsing)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(['paplay', tmp_file.name], capture_output=True, timeout=10)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.r = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["tmux", "select-window", "-t", tmux_pane], capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["launchctl", "kickstart", "-k", f"gui/{os.getuid()}/com.voicemode.{file_name}"], capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["systemctl", "--user", "daemon-reload"], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["systemctl", "--user", "start", service_unit], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, "-m", "voice_mode.mouth", "serve"], env=env,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.r = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.Popen(cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.r = subprocess.run(cmd, input=data, capture_output=True, timeout=60)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.r = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(cmd, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["systemctl", "--user", "stop", service_unit], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.unlike the npx prototype).Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# plaintext stores in ~/.voicemode/credentials (chmod 600)Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.logger.debug("could not chmod control socket %s", path, exc_info=True)Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# moment it's captured, so a break/kill mid-survey stillFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Force kill if neededFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.install_command: curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Local waiter (``pid`` set): liveness by PID probe (psutil; os.killFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.click.echo(f" npx mcp-remote {endpoint_url}")Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.logger.debug("could not chmod control socket dir %s", path.parent, exc_info=True)Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.``voicemode serve`` with ``npx -y mcp-remote``. That pulls in a Node/npxFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["systemctl", "--user", "daemon-reload"], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for voice-mode@9.0.2 as of 26 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim mbailey: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.