Skills/PyPI/vibedasher-mcp

vibedasher-mcp@0.9.98

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Vibedasher, the home for the dashboards your AI built: your coding agent creates the datasets, writes the dashboard and publishes it to a URL behind your login." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher juliengdnr · publishing for 103 daysInstalls 6,927Last detonated 34 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 27 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
VIBEDASHER_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: BASE_URL, VIBEDASHER_APP_URL, VIBEDASHER_CONFIG_DIR, VIBEDASHER_DISABLE_KEYRING, VIBEDASHER_HTTP_TIMING_FILE, VIBEDASHER_MCP_BARE
Where it talks to
vibedasher.com (its own)Also slack.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names slack.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects VIBEDASHER_API_KEY only into requests to vibedasher.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets VIBEDASHER_API_KEY=vibedasher.com -- uvx vibedasher-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.9.97

vet-skills diff vibedasher-mcp 0.9.97 0.9.98

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.9.97 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 69/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Slack webhook URL; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.0sprocessexited 1: ImportError: attempted relative import with no known parent package
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'httpx'
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessexited 1: ImportError: attempted relative import with no known parent package
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'httpx'
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.4sprocessexited 1: ImportError: attempted relative import with no known parent package
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.5sprocessexited 1: ImportError: attempted relative import with no known parent package
0.5sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.6sprocess8 of 27 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.6sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.6sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.6sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Slack webhook URLvibedasher_mcp/watcher_tools.py:478 · Slack webhook URL — data will be sent to Slack…config: email_list: {"addresses": ["[email protected]"]}; slack_webhook: {"url": "https://hooks.slack.com/services/..."}; webhook: {"url": "https://..."}. A webhook's answer carries its …Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsvibedasher_mcp/hosting.py:173 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files_IMPORT_META_ENV_RE = re.compile(r"import\.meta\.env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsvibedasher_mcp/hosting.py:1642 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"basenames": [".env", ".env.*"],Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Slack webhook URLvibedasher_mcp/watcher_tools.py:473 · Slack webhook URL — data will be sent to Slack…n-admin, a key without admin access, an `http://` URL, a Slack URL that is not `https://hooks.slack.com/...`, more than 20 addresses. Args: kind: email_list, slack_webhook…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandvibedasher_mcp/config.py:12 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions(``chmod 600``); a readable one is refused by name rather than used, becauseFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsvibedasher_mcp/hosting.py:425 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescharacters, so ``.env`` became ``env`` and ``.gitignore`` ``gitignore``."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandvibedasher_mcp/config.py:130 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsf"Run `chmod 600 {path}` and relaunch. It is NOT being read as it "Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsvibedasher_mcp/hosting.py:1193 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesos.path.basename(base) == ".env" or os.path.basename(base).startswith(".env."):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialsvibedasher_mcp/connect_link.py:28 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineeringURL, and the human opens it. They type the password into OUR page, in their ownFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagevibedasher_mcp/hosting.py:1623 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code"check (run `npx tsc --noEmit` locally with @types/react@18 if you want one). NO static assets, "Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandvibedasher_mcp/config.py:176 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsf"{DEFAULT_ENV_FILE} instead (one KEY=value per line) and `chmod 600` it; "Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈82 tok
1 file · 35 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

11 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim juliengdnr: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Slack webhook URL≈ +4 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim juliengdnrPropose a patch to the maintainer