Skills/PyPI/vibedasher-mcp

vibedasher-mcp@0.9.97

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Vibedasher, the home for the dashboards your AI built: your coding agent creates the datasets, writes the dashboard and publishes it to a URL behind your login." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher juliengdnr · publishing for 102 daysInstalls 6,443Last detonated 37 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 27 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
VIBEDASHER_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: BASE_URL, VIBEDASHER_APP_URL, VIBEDASHER_CONFIG_DIR, VIBEDASHER_DISABLE_KEYRING, VIBEDASHER_HTTP_TIMING_FILE, VIBEDASHER_MCP_BARE
Where it talks to
vibedasher.com (its own)Also slack.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names slack.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects VIBEDASHER_API_KEY only into requests to vibedasher.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets VIBEDASHER_API_KEY=vibedasher.com -- uvx vibedasher-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.9.49

vet-skills diff vibedasher-mcp 0.9.49 0.9.97

This version reaches for something 0.9.49 did not: 1 new host (slack.com). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

New hosts
slack.com

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 69/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Slack webhook URL; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.0sprocessexited 1: ImportError: attempted relative import with no known parent package
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'httpx'
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexited 1: ImportError: attempted relative import with no known parent package
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'httpx'
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessexited 1: ImportError: attempted relative import with no known parent package
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.4sprocessexited 1: ImportError: attempted relative import with no known parent package
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.4sprocess8 of 27 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsvibedasher_mcp/hosting.py:1642 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"basenames": [".env", ".env.*"],Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Slack webhook URLvibedasher_mcp/watcher_tools.py:473 · Slack webhook URL — data will be sent to Slack…n-admin, a key without admin access, an `http://` URL, a Slack URL that is not `https://hooks.slack.com/...`, more than 20 addresses. Args: kind: email_list, slack_webhook…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsvibedasher_mcp/hosting.py:173 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files_IMPORT_META_ENV_RE = re.compile(r"import\.meta\.env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsvibedasher_mcp/hosting.py:1193 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesos.path.basename(base) == ".env" or os.path.basename(base).startswith(".env."):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Slack webhook URLvibedasher_mcp/watcher_tools.py:478 · Slack webhook URL — data will be sent to Slack…config: email_list: {"addresses": ["[email protected]"]}; slack_webhook: {"url": "https://hooks.slack.com/services/..."}; webhook: {"url": "https://..."}. A webhook's answer carries its …Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagevibedasher_mcp/hosting.py:1623 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code"check (run `npx tsc --noEmit` locally with @types/react@18 if you want one). NO static assets, "Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandvibedasher_mcp/config.py:12 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions(``chmod 600``); a readable one is refused by name rather than used, becauseFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandvibedasher_mcp/config.py:130 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsf"Run `chmod 600 {path}` and relaunch. It is NOT being read as it "Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsvibedasher_mcp/hosting.py:425 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescharacters, so ``.env`` became ``env`` and ``.gitignore`` ``gitignore``."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandvibedasher_mcp/config.py:176 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsf"{DEFAULT_ENV_FILE} instead (one KEY=value per line) and `chmod 600` it; "Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialsvibedasher_mcp/connect_link.py:28 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineeringURL, and the human opens it. They type the password into OUR page, in their ownFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈82 tok
1 file · 35 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

11 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim juliengdnr: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Slack webhook URL≈ +4 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  5. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim juliengdnrPropose a patch to the maintainer