Skills/PyPI/verified-googledocs-mcp

verified-googledocs-mcp@0.2.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for Google Docs with verified writes" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher michaelrobertsutton · publishing for 103 daysInstalls 124Last detonated 41 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
VERIFIED_GOOGLEDOCS_MCP_CREDENTIALSConfiguration, not credentials: XDG_STATE_HOME
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso google.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names google.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects VERIFIED_GOOGLEDOCS_MCP_CREDENTIALS only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx verified-googledocs-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Hidden zero-width characters detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/verified_googledocs_mcp/markdown_mutations.py:1047 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, etc. to a doc-driven diff.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/verified_googledocs_mcp/markdown_mutations.py:1052 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".netrc",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/verified_googledocs_mcp/auth.py:60 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsthe file is written atomically (temp file chmod 0o600, then renamed) so itFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedscripts/seed_live_fixture.py:41 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content"Soft hyphen: super­seded\n"Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
Hidden zero-width characters detectedtests/live/test_reads.py:24 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contents = s.replace(" ", " ").replace("­", "") # NBSP -> space, soft hyphen -> goneFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedsrc/verified_googledocs_mcp/verify.py:444 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentif ch == "­":Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
Hidden zero-width characters detectedtests/live/test_replace_text.py:239 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentassert "👨‍👩‍👧" in afterFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedscripts/seed_live_fixture.py:33 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content#   = NBSP, ­ = soft hyphen. The duplicated fox sentence must appearFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/verified_googledocs_mcp/verify.py:938 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions# Open append-only, creating with owner-only perms; chmod each time so aFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Hidden zero-width characters detectedtests/unit/fixtures/document.json:115 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content"content": "Soft hyphen: super­seded\n",Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedscripts/seed_live_fixture.py:59 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content"ZWJ emoji sequence: \U0001f468‍\U0001f469‍\U0001f467 "Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_diff_tab_vs_file.py:471 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(which technically contains ~/.ssh), diff_tab_vs_file must refuse toFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Hidden zero-width characters detectedtests/unit/test_locate.py:361 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content# 👨‍💻 is U+1F468 ZWJ U+1F4BB = 2 + 1 (ZWJ is BMP) + 2 = 5 UTF-16 units.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
Hidden zero-width characters detectedtests/unit/test_locate.py:479 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contenttab = _tab(["pro­gramming"])Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_diff_tab_vs_file.py:430 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".netrc",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Hidden zero-width characters detectedtests/unit/test_locate.py:207 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contenttab = _tab(["pro­gramming"])Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
Hidden zero-width characters detectedtests/unit/test_markdown_writer.py:60 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentseq = "👨‍👩‍👧"Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
Hidden zero-width characters detectedtests/unit/test_tables.py:773 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content("soft­hyphen", "softhyphen"), # soft hyphen strippedFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
References a credential file in the home directorytests/unit/test_diff_tab_vs_file.py:473 · References a credential file in the home directorydenylist exists for ("diff against ~/.ssh/id_rsa")."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_audit.py:100 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# On macOS, Path.home() reads /etc/passwd, not $HOME, so patch it directly.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/unit/test_diff_tab_vs_file.py:473 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesdenylist exists for ("diff against ~/.ssh/id_rsa")."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Hidden zero-width characters detectedtests/unit/test_markdown_writer.py:59 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content# 👨‍👩‍👧 is a ZWJ sequence: three emoji + two ZWJs = 3*2 + 2*1 = 8 UTF-16 units.Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
Hidden zero-width characters detectedtests/unit/fixtures/document.json:693 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content"content": "ZWJ emoji sequence: 👨‍👩‍👧 (family: man+ZWJ+woman+ZWJ+girl)\n",Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
Hidden zero-width characters detectedtests/unit/test_locate.py:362 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentzwj_seq = "\U0001f468‍\U0001f4bb"Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
LOW
Dynamic module loadingtests/unit/test_entry_point.py:135 · Dynamic module loadingrunpy.run_module("verified_googledocs_mcp", run_name="__main__")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Hidden zero-width characters detectedtests/unit/test_locate.py:213 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentresult = locate("pro­gramming", tab)Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈54 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim michaelrobertsutton: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  5. References a credential file in the home directory≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. Dynamic module loading≈ +1 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim michaelrobertsuttonPropose a patch to the maintainer