Skills/npm/semiotic

semiotic@3.14.1

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Verified generative visualization for React and agents, with deterministic chart validation, repair, rendering evidence, and MCP." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher nteract · publishing for 3504 daysInstalls 51,112Last detonated 46 min ago
$claude mcp add semiotic -- npx -y semiotic
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y semiotic

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 3.13.3

vet-skills diff semiotic 3.13.3 3.14.1

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 3.13.3 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:789 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file…, so it can autoscale on serverless hosts without sticky sessions. For ChatGPT developer mode, expose the HTTP endpoint over HTTPS with a tunnel, set `MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS` to …Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/geo.min.js:18 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…Math.abs,me=Math.atan,ge=Math.atan2,ye=Math.cos,ve=Math.ceil,be=Math.exp,xe=Math.log,we=Math.sin,ke=Math.sign||function(e){return e>0?1:e<0?-1:0},Se=Math.sqrt,Me=Math.tan;function je(e){return e>1?ce:e<-1?-ce:Math.asin(e)}function Ae(e){re…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.md:789 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file…, so it can autoscale on serverless hosts without sticky sessions. For ChatGPT developer mode, expose the HTTP endpoint over HTTPS with a tunnel, set `MCP_ALLOWED_HOSTS` to …Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈67 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.