Skills/PyPI/uber-mcp

uber-mcp@0.5.4

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Unofficial MCP server for Uber rides: places, live fares, ride requests behind a confirm step, trip status and history" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher benjamin-di · publishing for 25 daysInstalls 1,883Last detonated 34 min ago
$claude mcp add uber-mcp -- uvx uber-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
UBER_LOGIN_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: CONNECTIONS_REQUIRE_CONTROLS, CONNECTIONS_SCREENSHOT, POCKET_ID_BIN, UBER_DEFAULT_ACCOUNT, UBER_LOGIN_MINUTES, UBER_LOGIN_NOVNC, UBER_LOGIN_SLOTS, UBER_LOGIN_X11VNC, UBER_LOGIN_XVFB, UBER_STATE_DIR, UBER_TEST_CHROME
Where it talks to
uber.com (its own)Also pythonhosted.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names pythonhosted.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects UBER_LOGIN_TOKEN only into requests to uber.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets UBER_LOGIN_TOKEN=uber.com -- uvx uber-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/check-portability.py:37 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedruntime-installer.py:38 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([str(venv / "bin/python"), "-c", f"import pip; assert pip.__version__ == '{VERSION}'"], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/source-identity.py:17 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.check_output(["git", *args], cwd=root, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedruntime-installer.py:37 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "venv", str(venv)], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:23 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm /tmp/requirements-runtime.lockFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_logs.py:284 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-c", code], check=True, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=20)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/ci-log.py:16 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocess = subprocess.Popen(command, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:34 · Destructive file system command detected&& rm -rf /app/src \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/connections_e2e.py:147 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocess = subprocess.Popen([str(binary)], cwd=provider_dir, env=env, stdout=provider_log, stderr=provider_log)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:10 · Destructive file system command detectedRUN python /tmp/runtime-installer.py && rm /tmp/runtime-installer.pyFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification command.github/workflows/ci.yml:56 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod +x /tmp/pocket-idFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_logs.py:256 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-c", code], check=True, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=20)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/check-build-identity.py:67 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedruntime-installer.py:29 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "pip", "install", "--no-deps", "--no-index", str(staged)], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,492 tok
2 files · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.