Skills/PyPI/uber-mcp

uber-mcp@0.4.0

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "Unofficial MCP server for Uber rides: places, live fares, ride requests behind a confirm step, trip status and history" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher benjamin-di · joined 0 days agoInstalls 0Last detonated 2 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-10-26 and scored it 63/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Python subprocess execution detected; Destructive file system command detected; Outbound HTTP to raw IP address. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.3sprocessexec .venv/bin/uber-mcp
0.3sprocessexited 127: timeout: failed to run command '.venv/bin/uber-mcp': No such file or directory
0.3sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 127)
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

HIGH
Python subprocess execution detectedruntime-installer.py:38 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
CRITICAL
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:30 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addressscripts/paste_e2e.py:150 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Python subprocess execution detectedruntime-installer.py:29 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Python subprocess execution detectedruntime-installer.py:37 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
CRITICAL
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:23 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_login_safety.py:34 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/source-identity.py:17 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addressscripts/paste_e2e.py:127 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
CRITICAL
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:10 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addresssrc/uber_mcp/cli.py:52 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addressscripts/paste_e2e.py:123 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addressscripts/paste_e2e.py:123 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondocs/DESIGN.md:42 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addressscripts/paste_e2e.py:127 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondocs/DESIGN.md:25 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addresssrc/uber_mcp/cli.py:52 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addressscripts/paste_e2e.py:150 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07

What would make this Verified

17 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Destructive file system command detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim benjamin-di: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Does not do what the description says≈ +5 on the totalIn the sandbox the skill never performed the task it claims (no call to the service it is for). Make sure the happy path runs without extra setup, or describe the real behavior.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. Outbound HTTP to raw IP address≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  6. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
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