tram-mcp@0.6.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server exposing TestRail API endpoints as tools for LLMs" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
TESTRAIL_API_KEYTESTRAIL_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: TESTRAIL_URL, TESTRAIL_USERNAME, TRAM_MCP_CHILD, TRAM_MCP_NO_AUTO_UPDATE, TRAM_MCP_NO_LAUNCHER- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso astral.sh, testrail.io — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names astral.sh, testrail.io as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TESTRAIL_API_KEY, TESTRAIL_PASSWORD only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
Supports both regular .env files and FIFO named pipes (used by someFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."""Regenerate tram_mcp/tools_static.json from FastMCP's live tools/list output.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.monkeypatch.setattr(_autoupdate, "_looks_like_uv_tool_install", lambda: True)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.child = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."""Load env vars from .env if present.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.monkeypatch.setattr(_autoupdate, "_looks_like_uv_tool_install", lambda: True)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.stale = time.time() - (_autoupdate.CHECK_INTERVAL_SECONDS + 60)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.monkeypatch.setattr(_autoupdate, "_looks_like_uv_tool_install", lambda: True)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.env_path = Path(".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.We use subprocess.run (not os.execvp) because on Windows execvp isFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.p = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.spec.loader.exec_module(mod)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.
What would make this Verified
1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim trtmn: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
- Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Dynamic module loading≈ +1 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.