Skills/PyPI/tram-mcp

tram-mcp@0.6.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server exposing TestRail API endpoints as tools for LLMs" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher trtmn · publishing for 177 daysInstalls 93Last detonated 20 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
TESTRAIL_API_KEYTESTRAIL_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: TESTRAIL_URL, TESTRAIL_USERNAME, TRAM_MCP_CHILD, TRAM_MCP_NO_AUTO_UPDATE, TRAM_MCP_NO_LAUNCHER
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso astral.sh, testrail.io — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names astral.sh, testrail.io as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TESTRAIL_API_KEY, TESTRAIL_PASSWORD only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx tram-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathstram_mcp/server.py:15 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesSupports both regular .env files and FIFO named pipes (used by someFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionscripts/regenerate_static_tools.py:1 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files"""Regenerate tram_mcp/tools_static.json from FastMCP's live tools/list output.Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationtests/test_autoupdate.py:40 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimemonkeypatch.setattr(_autoupdate, "_looks_like_uv_tool_install", lambda: True)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtram_mcp/__init__.py:134 · Python subprocess execution detectedchild = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmain.py:86 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathstram_mcp/server.py:13 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Load env vars from .env if present.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationtests/test_autoupdate.py:28 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimemonkeypatch.setattr(_autoupdate, "_looks_like_uv_tool_install", lambda: True)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationtests/test_autoupdate.py:44 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimestale = time.time() - (_autoupdate.CHECK_INTERVAL_SECONDS + 60)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmain.py:118 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationtests/test_autoupdate.py:57 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimemonkeypatch.setattr(_autoupdate, "_looks_like_uv_tool_install", lambda: True)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathstram_mcp/server.py:26 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_path = Path(".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmain.py:114 · Python subprocess execution detectedWe use subprocess.run (not os.execvp) because on Windows execvp isFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtram_mcp/_autoupdate.py:81 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/regenerate_static_tools.py:45 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
Dynamic module loadingtests/test_launcher.py:285 · Dynamic module loadingmod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Dynamic module loadingtests/test_launcher.py:286 · Dynamic module loading (importlib.loader.exec_module via provenance)spec.loader.exec_module(mod)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmain.py:57 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈49 tok
1 file · 25 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim trtmn: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  4. Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. Dynamic module loading≈ +1 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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