Skills/PyPI/timem-mcp

timem-mcp@0.9.3

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "TiMEM MCP Server - Model Context Protocol server for TiMEM Engine" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher timem-ai · publishing for 300 daysInstalls 93Last detonated 2 h ago
$claude mcp add timem-mcp -- uvx timem-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
TiMEM_API_KEYTIMEM_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_HOST, MCP_PORT, MCP_TUNNEL_URL, MCP_URL, TiMEM_API_HOST, TIMEM_AUTO_SCENE, TiMEM_MCP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS, TIMEM_MCP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS, TiMEM_MCP_HOST, TiMEM_MCP_LOG_LEVEL, TiMEM_MCP_PATH, TiMEM_MCP_PORT, TiMEM_MCP_STATELESS_HTTP, TIMEM_MCP_STATELESS_HTTP, TiMEM_MCP_TOOL_PROFILE, TIMEM_MCP_TOOL_PROFILE, TiMEM_OTHER_USER_ID, TiMEM_USER_ID, TIMEM_USER_ID
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso timem.cloud, trycloudflare.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names timem.cloud, trycloudflare.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TiMEM_API_KEY, TIMEM_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx timem-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 82/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.5sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.5sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.5sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.5sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Tunneling service URLscripts/coding_mcp_test_suite.py:33 · Tunneling service URL — may route traffic to attacker infrastructure"https://kingston-stroke-surrounded-earn.trycloudflare.com/mcp/",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/conftest.py:31 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filespytest.skip("TiMEM_API_KEY not set (env or tests/.env.live)")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/coding_mcp_test_suite.py:20 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files_LIVE_ENV = _ROOT / "tests" / ".env.live"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_mcp_stdio.py:36 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/conftest.py:8 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files_LIVE_ENV_FILE = Path(__file__).parent / ".env.live"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/trigger_behavior_test.py:20 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# MCP mounted on 8001 callbacks to TiMEM_API_HOST (default 8000 in .env)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈2,908 tok
2 files · 80 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for timem-mcp@0.9.3 as of 2 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.