timem-mcp@0.9.3
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "TiMEM MCP Server - Model Context Protocol server for TiMEM Engine" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
TiMEM_API_KEYTIMEM_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_HOST, MCP_PORT, MCP_TUNNEL_URL, MCP_URL, TiMEM_API_HOST, TIMEM_AUTO_SCENE, TiMEM_MCP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS, TIMEM_MCP_ALLOWED_ORIGINS, TiMEM_MCP_HOST, TiMEM_MCP_LOG_LEVEL, TiMEM_MCP_PATH, TiMEM_MCP_PORT, TiMEM_MCP_STATELESS_HTTP, TIMEM_MCP_STATELESS_HTTP, TiMEM_MCP_TOOL_PROFILE, TIMEM_MCP_TOOL_PROFILE, TiMEM_OTHER_USER_ID, TiMEM_USER_ID, TIMEM_USER_ID- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso timem.cloud, trycloudflare.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names timem.cloud, trycloudflare.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects TiMEM_API_KEY, TIMEM_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 82/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"https://kingston-stroke-surrounded-earn.trycloudflare.com/mcp/",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.pytest.skip("TiMEM_API_KEY not set (env or tests/.env.live)")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose._LIVE_ENV = _ROOT / "tests" / ".env.live"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out._LIVE_ENV_FILE = Path(__file__).parent / ".env.live"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# MCP mounted on 8001 callbacks to TiMEM_API_HOST (default 8000 in .env)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for timem-mcp@0.9.3 as of 2 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.