Skills/PyPI/tf-mcp-server

tf-mcp-server@0.35.4

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for ToothFairyAI documentation, SDK operations, and cross-workspace agent migration via @toothfairyai/cli" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher toothfairyai-support · publishing for 299 daysInstalls 1,175Last detonated 33 min ago
$claude mcp add tf-mcp-server -- uvx tf-mcp-server
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
API_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: API_DOCS_PATH, API_URL, BASE_PATH, DB_URL, DOCS_PATH, MCP_HOST, MCP_PORT, MCP_TRANSPORT, OUT_NAME, TF_ENV, TFCODE_DOCS_ROOT, TFCODE_VERSION, TFDESIGN_PATH
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso toothfairyai.com, toothfairylab.link, microsoft.com, microsoftonline.com, azure.com, weather.com, amazonaws.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names toothfairyai.com, toothfairylab.link, microsoft.com, microsoftonline.com, azure.com, weather.com, amazonaws.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects API_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx tf-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.35.1

vet-skills diff tf-mcp-server 0.35.1 0.35.4

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.35.1 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

0.35.1 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 83/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/hook_code_runtime.py:481 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files"cause": "Runtime auto-converts .json in output to .txt (re-dumps content).",Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/hook_code_runtime.py:295 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files"Any .json file in the output folder is auto-converted: its "Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)server.py:2407 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network"package": "tf-mcp-server (this server) / hosted https://mcp.toothfairyai.com/sse",Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/hook_code_runtime.py:296 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files"content is re-dumped to a .txt and the .txt is uploaded; the "Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codeskills/python_tool_runtime.py:179 · Python exec or eval of computed code" exec()s the combined string (see hook-code-runtime).",Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationtools/sdk_guidelines.py:146 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsIMPORTANT: Never pass secret values directly in authorisations.create().Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationskills/setup_authorisation.py:53 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials"For OAuth authorization_code: do NOT pass token_secret here. It will be set in step 3.",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codeskills/hook_code_runtime.py:77 · Python exec or eval of computed code"Your code string is executed via exec() in a sandboxed globals "Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtools/cli_tools.py:33 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codeskills/hook_code_runtime.py:86 · Python exec or eval of computed code"exec(code, namespace, namespace) # globals == locals"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionserver.py:1649 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files"Output files must go to /tmp/{ws}/{msg}/output/ to be auto-uploaded to S3 (.json auto-converted to .txt); print() text output",Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/hook_code_runtime.py:453 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files"Output written to .../output/summary.csv is auto-uploaded to S3.",Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/hook_code_runtime.py:330 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files"Expect .json outputs to stay .json (auto-converted to .txt)",Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈66 tok
1 file · 58 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.