Skills/PyPI/tf-mcp-server

tf-mcp-server@0.35.1

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for ToothFairyAI documentation, SDK operations, and cross-workspace agent migration via @toothfairyai/cli" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher toothfairyai-support · publishing for 296 daysInstalls 1,076Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add tf-mcp-server -- uvx tf-mcp-server
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
API_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: API_DOCS_PATH, API_URL, BASE_PATH, DB_URL, DOCS_PATH, MCP_HOST, MCP_PORT, MCP_TRANSPORT, OUT_NAME, TF_ENV, TFCODE_PATH, TFCODE_STABLE_PATH, TFCODE_STABLE_VERSION, TFDESIGN_PATH
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso toothfairyai.com, toothfairylab.link, microsoft.com, microsoftonline.com, azure.com, weather.com, amazonaws.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names toothfairyai.com, toothfairylab.link, microsoft.com, microsoftonline.com, azure.com, weather.com, amazonaws.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects API_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx tf-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 80/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationskills/setup_authorisation.py:53 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials"For OAuth authorization_code: do NOT pass token_secret here. It will be set in step 3.",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codeskills/hook_code_runtime.py:77 · Python exec or eval of computed code"Your code string is executed via exec() in a sandboxed globals "Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationtools/sdk_guidelines.py:146 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsIMPORTANT: Never pass secret values directly in authorisations.create().Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codeskills/hook_code_runtime.py:86 · Python exec or eval of computed code"exec(code, namespace, namespace) # globals == locals"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codeskills/python_tool_runtime.py:179 · Python exec or eval of computed code" exec()s the combined string (see hook-code-runtime).",Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/hook_code_runtime.py:296 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files"content is re-dumped to a .txt and the .txt is uploaded; the "Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/hook_code_runtime.py:330 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files"Expect .json outputs to stay .json (auto-converted to .txt)",Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtools/cli_tools.py:33 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/hook_code_runtime.py:295 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files"Any .json file in the output folder is auto-converted: its "Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)server.py:2398 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network"package": "tf-mcp-server (this server) / hosted https://mcp.toothfairyai.com/sse",Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionserver.py:1674 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files"Output files must go to /tmp/{ws}/{msg}/output/ to be auto-uploaded to S3 (.json auto-converted to .txt); print() text output",Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/hook_code_runtime.py:481 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files"cause": "Runtime auto-converts .json in output to .txt (re-dumps content).",Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/hook_code_runtime.py:453 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files"Output written to .../output/summary.csv is auto-uploaded to S3.",Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈66 tok
1 file · 56 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for tf-mcp-server@0.35.1 as of 9 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.