Skills/PyPI/talkops-kargo-mcp-server

talkops-kargo-mcp-server@0.2.1

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Execution-only MCP server and Agent Skills package for Kargo v1.12 continuous promotion orchestration." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher talkops-ai · publishing for 0 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 40 min ago
$claude mcp add talkops-kargo-mcp-server -- uvx talkops-kargo-mcp-server
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
KARGO_ADMIN_PASSWORDKARGO_AUTH_MODEKARGO_AUTH_TOKENKARGO_CREDENTIALS_FILEKARGO_REPO_PASSWORDKARGO_STATIC_BEARER_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: KARGO_API_URL, KARGO_BASE_URL, KARGO_DEFAULT_PROJECT, KARGO_PROJECT, KARGO_REPO_USERNAME, KARGO_TIMEOUT, KARGO_VERIFY_SSL, MCP_ALLOW_WRITE, MCP_DEBUG, MCP_HOST, MCP_PATH, MCP_PORT, MCP_PROJECT, MCP_READ_ONLY, MCP_SERVER_NAME, MCP_SERVER_VERSION, MCP_TOOLSETS, MCP_TRANSPORT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for KARGO_ADMIN_PASSWORD, KARGO_AUTH_MODE, KARGO_AUTH_TOKEN, KARGO_CREDENTIALS_FILE, KARGO_REPO_PASSWORD, KARGO_STATIC_BEARER_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx talkops-kargo-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

LOW
Authorization escalation languagedocs/kargo-research/interal-reference.md:343 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction fileEnsure we have an admin JWT token (ADMIN mode).Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languagedocs/kargo-research/interal-reference.md:380 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file# In admin mode, make sure we have a tokenFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languagedocs/kargo-research/interal-reference.md:48 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file# Used in ADMIN mode – server will login and obtain JWTFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:48 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschown -R app:app /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languagedocs/kargo-research/Kargo-Comprehensive.md:381 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file- **MCP server behaviour:** In admin mode, the MCP server can either:Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:43 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* && \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:22 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,972 tok
4 files · 80 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.