talkops-kargo-mcp-server@0.2.1
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "Execution-only MCP server and Agent Skills package for Kargo v1.12 continuous promotion orchestration." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
KARGO_ADMIN_PASSWORDKARGO_AUTH_MODEKARGO_AUTH_TOKENKARGO_CREDENTIALS_FILEKARGO_REPO_PASSWORDKARGO_STATIC_BEARER_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: KARGO_API_URL, KARGO_BASE_URL, KARGO_DEFAULT_PROJECT, KARGO_PROJECT, KARGO_REPO_USERNAME, KARGO_TIMEOUT, KARGO_VERIFY_SSL, MCP_ALLOW_WRITE, MCP_DEBUG, MCP_HOST, MCP_PATH, MCP_PORT, MCP_PROJECT, MCP_READ_ONLY, MCP_SERVER_NAME, MCP_SERVER_VERSION, MCP_TOOLSETS, MCP_TRANSPORT- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for KARGO_ADMIN_PASSWORD, KARGO_AUTH_MODE, KARGO_AUTH_TOKEN, KARGO_CREDENTIALS_FILE, KARGO_REPO_PASSWORD, KARGO_STATIC_BEARER_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
Ensure we have an admin JWT token (ADMIN mode).Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.# In admin mode, make sure we have a tokenFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.# Used in ADMIN mode – server will login and obtain JWTFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.chown -R app:app /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.- **MCP server behaviour:** In admin mode, the MCP server can either:Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* && \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.