talkops-alertmanager-mcp-server@0.2.1
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server and Agent Plugins v1.0.0 skill suite for Prometheus Alertmanager alert triage, routing simulation, silence governance, and SRE hygiene." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso cluster.local, talkops.io — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: URL with embedded credentials; URL with embedded credentials; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
# Matches URLs with embedded userinfo: https://user:[email protected]/pathFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.return subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.api_url: "https://hooks.slack.com/services/T000/B000/SECRET_DEFAULT"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.spec.loader.exec_module(mod)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.from alertmanager_mcp_server.services.http_client import AlertmanagerHttpClientFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.redact_url_userinfo("https://admin:[email protected]:9093/api")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* && \Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.…et-value`, read `.env` files, print raw webhook/routing tokens, or pass inline `https://user:pass@host` credentials. Always include a **concrete hardened `alertmanager.yaml` `rec…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.== "https://***:***@am.internal:9093/api"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.assert wh["url"] == "https://***:***@webhook.internal.example.com/hook"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.- url: "https://user:[email protected]/hook"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."cp /cfg/alertmanager-dr.yml /dr-cfg/alertmanager.yml && chmod 0777 /dr-cfg && chmod 0666 /dr-cfg/alertmanager.yml",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chown -R app:app /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.api_url: "https://hooks.slack.com/services/T000/B000/SECRET_PAY"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.… (`secret-safety.py`)**: Never run `aws secretsmanager get-secret-value`, read `.env` files, print raw webhook/routing tokens, or pass inline `https://user:pass@hos…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.
What would make this Verified
3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim talkops-ai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Slack webhook URL≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
- MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.