Propose a patch
A fix the maintainer can act on, with the evidence attached. It opens under your GitHub account in your browser; KillerSkills holds no token and never modifies the package. The fix is verified the only way we verify anything: the next crawl re-runs the new version in the honeypot. 77 · Caution
Evidence
The sandbox observed nothing beyond the static findings; the proposal cites those.
Diff · removes 6 caught lines
Download .patchdiff --git a/alertmanager_mcp_server/domain/redaction.py b/alertmanager_mcp_server/domain/redaction.py --- a/alertmanager_mcp_server/domain/redaction.py +++ b/alertmanager_mcp_server/domain/redaction.py @@ -66,1 +66,0 @@ -# Matches URLs with embedded userinfo: https://user:[email protected]/path diff --git a/tests/unit/test_domain_redaction.py b/tests/unit/test_domain_redaction.py --- a/tests/unit/test_domain_redaction.py +++ b/tests/unit/test_domain_redaction.py @@ -38,1 +38,0 @@ -assert wh["url"] == "https://***:***@webhook.internal.example.com/hook" @@ -42,1 +41,0 @@ -redact_url_userinfo("https://admin:[email protected]:9093/api") @@ -43,1 +41,0 @@ -== "https://***:***@am.internal:9093/api" diff --git a/skills/diagnosing-missed-notifications/SKILL.md b/skills/diagnosing-missed-notifications/SKILL.md --- a/skills/diagnosing-missed-notifications/SKILL.md +++ b/skills/diagnosing-missed-notifications/SKILL.md @@ -67,1 +67,0 @@ -…et-value`, read `.env` files, print raw webhook/routing tokens, or pass inline `https://user:pass@host` credentials. Always include a **concrete hardened `alertmanager.yaml` `rec… diff --git a/tests/conftest.py b/tests/conftest.py --- a/tests/conftest.py +++ b/tests/conftest.py @@ -173,1 +173,0 @@ -- url: "https://user:[email protected]/hook"
Zero-context hunks: apply with git apply --unidiff-zero fix.patch on the tagged source of 0.2.1. If the behavior is intended, declare it (host under permissions.network, a line in the README) instead of removing it; the next crawl scores declarations.
Issue / PR body
Title: talkops-alertmanager-mcp-server: URL with embedded credentials (KillerSkills verdict caution 77)
## What the honeypot observed KillerSkills ran **[email protected]** in an isolated sandbox (decoy credentials, recording proxy, syscall trace; engine 1.9.2) and scored it **CAUTION 77/100**. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory. - See the findings below. Full trace and findings: https://killerskills.ai/skills/pypi/talkops-alertmanager-mcp-server/0.2.1 ## Findings with a location - `alertmanager_mcp_server/domain/redaction.py:66` · URL with embedded credentials — alertmanager_mcp_server/domain/redaction.py:66 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking - `tests/unit/test_domain_redaction.py:42` · URL with embedded credentials — tests/unit/test_domain_redaction.py:42 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking - `skills/diagnosing-missed-notifications/SKILL.md:67` · URL with embedded credentials — skills/diagnosing-missed-notifications/SKILL.md:67 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking - `tests/unit/test_domain_redaction.py:43` · URL with embedded credentials — tests/unit/test_domain_redaction.py:43 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking - `tests/unit/test_domain_redaction.py:38` · URL with embedded credentials — tests/unit/test_domain_redaction.py:38 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking - `tests/conftest.py:173` · URL with embedded credentials — tests/conftest.py:173 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking ## Proposed change The attached patch removes the 6 lines above. If the behavior is intended, the fix is to declare it instead: list the host under `permissions.network` (or the MCP manifest) and say in the README why the package needs it; the next crawl will re-score it with the declaration taken into account. ## How this will be verified Nothing is "verified safe" by assertion. When a new version is published, KillerSkills re-runs it in the honeypot and the verdict page updates; you can trigger it early from the verdict page ("Re-scan after I publish a fix"). Reply here or at [email protected] if you believe the verdict is wrong; disputes are reviewed by a person and the outcome is published on the verdict page. _Proposed through killerskills.ai/threats by a user of the package, under their own GitHub account. The evidence is public; the package was never modified by KillerSkills._
# or from a terminal, under your own account: gh repo fork talkops-ai/talkops-mcp --clone && cd talkops-mcp curl -s https://killerskills.ai/skills/pypi/talkops-alertmanager-mcp-server/0.2.1/patch.diff | git apply --unidiff-zero git checkout -b killerskills/0.2.1 && git commit -am "talkops-alertmanager-mcp-server: URL with embedded credentials" gh pr create --fill --body-file <(curl -s https://killerskills.ai/skills/pypi/talkops-alertmanager-mcp-server/0.2.1/patch.md)
We count proposals opened, not merged: a merge shows up as a new version that the crawl re-runs. Disputes: the maintainer can contest the verdict from its page; a person reviews it and the outcome is published.