Skills/PyPI/swiss-truth-mcp

swiss-truth-mcp@0.1.2

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Verified knowledge base for AI agents — stop hallucinations with certified, source-backed facts via MCP" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher swisstruthorg · publishing for 222 daysInstalls 63Last detonated 18 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
swisstruth.org (its own)Also polygon-rpc.com, etherscan.io, polygonscan.com, basescan.org, arbiscan.io, open-claude.com, arxiv.org, admin.ch, snb.ch, parlament.ch, europa.eu, who.int, nih.gov, ibm.com, quantum.google, nist.gov, owasp.org, nasa.gov, esa.int, broadinstitute.org, clinicaltrials.gov, imf.org, worldbank.org, un.org, icc-cpi.int, iea.org, irena.org, supremecourt.gov, cornell.edu — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable and talks to swisstruth.org, its own; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx swiss-truth-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Access to sensitive file paths; Destructive file system command detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Privileged sudo commanddeploy/update.sh:87 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges"sudo docker exec swiss-truth-api sh -c \"find /app/src -name '*.pyc' -delete && find /app/src -type d -name '__pycache__' -exec rm -rf {} + 2>/dev/null; echo done\" 2>/dev/null || true"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/swiss_truth_mcp/blockchain/anchor.py:13 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesConfig (.env):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detecteddeploy/deploy.sh:36 · Destructive file system command detectedrm /tmp/swiss-truth-api.tar.gzFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/swiss_truth_mcp/api/main.py:27 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkfrom swiss_truth_mcp.mcp_server.http_server import mcp_session_manager, handle_mcp_requestFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/swiss_truth_mcp/config.py:6 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesmodel_config = SettingsConfigDict(env_file=".env", extra="ignore")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandstop.sh:7 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeslsof -ti:8001 | xargs kill -9 2>/dev/null && echo "REST API gestoppt." || echo "REST API war nicht aktiv."Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/swiss_truth_mcp/config.py:27 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Auth — JWT Secret Key (in Produktion unbedingt in .env setzen!)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commanddeploy/update.sh:63 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges"cd ${DEPLOY_DIR} && sudo docker build -t swiss-truth-api:latest . 2>&1 | tail -5"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commanddeploy/update.sh:91 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges"sudo docker restart swiss-truth-api"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commanddeploy/update.sh:74 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesecho " ⚠ HTTP ${HTTP} — Logs: ssh ${SERVER_USER}@${SERVER_HOST} 'sudo docker logs swiss-truth-api --tail 30'"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detecteddeploy/deploy.sh:49 · Destructive file system command detectedrm /tmp/swiss-truth-api.tar.gzFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commanddeploy/update.sh:67 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges"cd ${DEPLOY_DIR} && sudo docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml up -d --force-recreate api"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈64 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for swiss-truth-mcp@0.1.2 as of 18 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim swisstruthorg: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
  6. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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