swiss-truth-mcp@0.1.2
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Verified knowledge base for AI agents — stop hallucinations with certified, source-backed facts via MCP" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- swisstruth.org (its own)Also polygon-rpc.com, etherscan.io, polygonscan.com, basescan.org, arbiscan.io, open-claude.com, arxiv.org, admin.ch, snb.ch, parlament.ch, europa.eu, who.int, nih.gov, ibm.com, quantum.google, nist.gov, owasp.org, nasa.gov, esa.int, broadinstitute.org, clinicaltrials.gov, imf.org, worldbank.org, un.org, icc-cpi.int, iea.org, irena.org, supremecourt.gov, cornell.edu — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable and talks to swisstruth.org, its own; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 72/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Access to sensitive file paths; Destructive file system command detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"sudo docker exec swiss-truth-api sh -c \"find /app/src -name '*.pyc' -delete && find /app/src -type d -name '__pycache__' -exec rm -rf {} + 2>/dev/null; echo done\" 2>/dev/null || true"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Config (.env):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.rm /tmp/swiss-truth-api.tar.gzFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.from swiss_truth_mcp.mcp_server.http_server import mcp_session_manager, handle_mcp_requestFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.model_config = SettingsConfigDict(env_file=".env", extra="ignore")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.lsof -ti:8001 | xargs kill -9 2>/dev/null && echo "REST API gestoppt." || echo "REST API war nicht aktiv."Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# Auth — JWT Secret Key (in Produktion unbedingt in .env setzen!)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."cd ${DEPLOY_DIR} && sudo docker build -t swiss-truth-api:latest . 2>&1 | tail -5"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."sudo docker restart swiss-truth-api"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.echo " ⚠ HTTP ${HTTP} — Logs: ssh ${SERVER_USER}@${SERVER_HOST} 'sudo docker logs swiss-truth-api --tail 30'"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.rm /tmp/swiss-truth-api.tar.gzFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."cd ${DEPLOY_DIR} && sudo docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml up -d --force-recreate api"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for swiss-truth-mcp@0.1.2 as of 18 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
8 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim swisstruthorg: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.