Skills/PyPI/svg-mcp

svg-mcp@0.10.7

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "A FastMCP server exposing structured, hierarchical SVG authoring with a render-and-see feedback loop." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher georgeharker · publishing for 146 daysInstalls 1,597Last detonated 40 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
SVG_MCP_WEB_AUTHSVG_MCP_WEB_PASSWORDSVG_MCP_WEB_PASSWORD_HASH or --auth-token-fileConfiguration, not credentials: VENDORED_PATHS, XDG_STATE_HOME
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso prettier.io, githubusercontent.com, unpkg.com, figma.com, inkscape.org, sourceforge.net — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names prettier.io, githubusercontent.com, unpkg.com, figma.com, inkscape.org, sourceforge.net as well as its own vendor. The guard injects SVG_MCP_WEB_AUTH, SVG_MCP_WEB_PASSWORD, SVG_MCP_WEB_PASSWORD_HASH only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx svg-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.10.4

vet-skills diff svg-mcp 0.10.4 0.10.7

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.10.4 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

0.10.4 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Hidden zero-width characters detected; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/svg_mcp/config.py:3 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesPrecedence, highest first: explicit ``Settings(...)`` arguments, environment, ``.env``,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedsrc/svg_mcp/_ext_apps_inline.js:38 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content…ted,t=k(n.input),o=u[t]??t;if(/^[A-Z]/.test(n.expected))return`ورودی نامعتبر: می‌بایست instanceof ${n.expected} می‌بود، ${o} دریافت شد`;return`ورودی نامعتبر: می‌…Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/svg_mcp/config.py:1 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Runtime configuration: ``SVG_MCP_*`` env vars, a ``.env`` file, then a TOML config file.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/svg_mcp/_ext_apps_inline.js:61 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…is._capabilities=i;this.options=$;this.setRequestHandler(Xn,(u)=>{return console.log("Received ping:",u.params),{}}),this.onhostcontextchanged=()=>{}}getHostCapabilities(){return this._hostCapabilities}getHostVersion(){return this._hostInf…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/svg_mcp/webauth.py:450 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/svg_mcp/webauth.py:483 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/sync-vendored.sh:59 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionscase "$path" in */bin/*) chmod +x "$dest" ;; esacFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/svg_mcp/render/export.py:119 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(args, capture_output=True, check=False, timeout=60)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/svg_mcp/config.py:105 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_prefix="SVG_MCP_", env_file=".env", extra="ignore", env_nested_delimiter="__"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/svg_mcp/server.py:7008 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# OS-level signal kill always lands. SIGKILL still can't be caught; the OS reclaims it then.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/svg_mcp/webauth.py:504 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/svg_mcp/preview.py:590 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesview.addEventListener('dragstart', (e) => e.preventDefault()); // kill native image drag-ghostFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/svg_mcp/webauth.py:261 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsf"web_auth key {path} is readable by others; `chmod 600 {path}` "Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/svg_mcp/render/resvg.py:66 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈60 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim georgeharker: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim georgeharkerPropose a patch to the maintainer