Skills/PyPI/svg-mcp

svg-mcp@0.10.4

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "A FastMCP server exposing structured, hierarchical SVG authoring with a render-and-see feedback loop." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher georgeharker · publishing for 142 daysInstalls 592Last detonated 6d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
SVG_MCP_WEB_AUTHSVG_MCP_WEB_PASSWORDSVG_MCP_WEB_PASSWORD_HASH or --auth-token-fileConfiguration, not credentials: SVG_MCP_HOST, SVG_MCP_PORT, SVG_MCP_PREVIEW, SVG_MCP_PREVIEW_HOST, SVG_MCP_PREVIEW_PORT, SVG_MCP_SHUTDOWN_GRACE, SVG_MCP_TRANSPORT, VENDORED_PATHS, XDG_STATE_HOME
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso prettier.io, githubusercontent.com, unpkg.com, figma.com, inkscape.org, sourceforge.net — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names prettier.io, githubusercontent.com, unpkg.com, figma.com, inkscape.org, sourceforge.net as well as its own vendor. The guard injects SVG_MCP_WEB_AUTH, SVG_MCP_WEB_PASSWORD, SVG_MCP_WEB_PASSWORD_HASH only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx svg-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Hidden zero-width characters detected; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/svg_mcp/preview.py:587 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesview.addEventListener('dragstart', (e) => e.preventDefault()); // kill native image drag-ghostFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/svg_mcp/render/export.py:119 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(args, capture_output=True, check=False, timeout=60)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedsrc/svg_mcp/_ext_apps_inline.js:38 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content…ted,t=k(n.input),o=u[t]??t;if(/^[A-Z]/.test(n.expected))return`ورودی نامعتبر: می‌بایست instanceof ${n.expected} می‌بود، ${o} دریافت شد`;return`ورودی نامعتبر: می‌…Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/svg_mcp/_ext_apps_inline.js:61 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…is._capabilities=i;this.options=$;this.setRequestHandler(Xn,(u)=>{return console.log("Received ping:",u.params),{}}),this.onhostcontextchanged=()=>{}}getHostCapabilities(){return this._hostCapabilities}getHostVersion(){return this._hostInf…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/sync-vendored.sh:59 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionscase "$path" in */bin/*) chmod +x "$dest" ;; esacFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/svg_mcp/config.py:1 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Runtime configuration, sourced from environment (prefix ``SVG_MCP_``) or a ``.env`` file."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/svg_mcp/config.py:57 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_prefix="SVG_MCP_", env_file=".env", extra="ignore", env_nested_delimiter="__"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/svg_mcp/webauth.py:398 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/svg_mcp/webauth.py:430 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/svg_mcp/webauth.py:259 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsf"web_auth key {path} is readable by others; `chmod 600 {path}` "Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/svg_mcp/render/resvg.py:66 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/svg_mcp/webauth.py:449 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/svg_mcp/server.py:7011 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# OS-level signal kill always lands. SIGKILL still can't be caught; the OS reclaims it then.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈60 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for svg-mcp@0.10.4 as of 6d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim georgeharker: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim georgeharkerPropose a patch to the maintainer