Skills/PyPI/stencil-mcp

stencil-mcp@0.2.2

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Original SVG architecture assets, deterministic compositor, and local MCP server" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher malindarathnayake · publishing for 36 daysInstalls 79Last detonated 5 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx stencil-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Hex-encoded string detected; Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_kit.py:179 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesself.assertIn('error',srv.dispatch(req('resources/read',{'uri':'file:///etc/passwd'})))Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_kit.py:191 · Python subprocess execution detectedrun=subprocess.run([sys.executable,str(ROOT/'server.py')],input='x'*1_048_578,text=True,capture_output=True,timeout=5)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Hex-encoded string detecteddiagramkit/scene.py:12 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloads…range they trip CodeQL's py/overly-large-range. ILLEGAL_TEXT=re.compile(r'[\x00-\x08\x0b\x0c\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f\x7f\ud800-\udfff\ufffe\uffff\u200b\u2060-\u2064\ufeff\u202a-\u202e\u2066-\…Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_kit.py:43 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileswith self.assertRaises(ValueError):asset_info('../../etc/passwd',True)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:82 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>Run from a clone (contributors)</b></summary> ```bash git clone https://github.com/malindarathnayake/stencil-mcp.git cd stencil-mcp python -m unitteFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_kit.py:188 · Python subprocess execution detectedrun=subprocess.run([sys.executable,str(ROOT/'server.py')],input='not json\n'+json.dumps(req('ping'))+'\n',text=True,capture_output=True,timeout=5)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_kit.py:185 · Python subprocess execution detectedrun=subprocess.run([sys.executable,str(ROOT/'server.py')],input='\n'.join(json.dumps(x) for x in lines)+'\n',text=True,encoding='utf-8',capture_output=True,timeout=15)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Unicode escape sequence detectedtests/test_kit.py:241 · Unicode escape sequence detected — may contain obfuscated payloadss=scene();s['nodes'][0]['label']='\u0645\u06cc\u200c\u062e\u0648\u0627\u0647\u0645';self.assertTrue(validate(s)['valid'])Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_kit.py:276 · Python subprocess execution detectedrun=subprocess.run([sys.executable,str(ROOT/'server.py')],input=lines,text=True,encoding='utf-8',capture_output=True,timeout=10)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈56 tok
1 file · 48 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for stencil-mcp@0.2.2 as of 4 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim malindarathnayake: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Hex-encoded string detected≈ +4 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. Unicode escape sequence detected≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim malindarathnayakePropose a patch to the maintainer