stencil-mcp@0.2.2
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Original SVG architecture assets, deterministic compositor, and local MCP server" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Hex-encoded string detected; Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
self.assertIn('error',srv.dispatch(req('resources/read',{'uri':'file:///etc/passwd'})))Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.run=subprocess.run([sys.executable,str(ROOT/'server.py')],input='x'*1_048_578,text=True,capture_output=True,timeout=5)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.…range they trip CodeQL's py/overly-large-range. ILLEGAL_TEXT=re.compile(r'[\x00-\x08\x0b\x0c\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f\x7f\ud800-\udfff\ufffe\uffff\u200b\u2060-\u2064\ufeff\u202a-\u202e\u2066-\…Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.with self.assertRaises(ValueError):asset_info('../../etc/passwd',True)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.<summary><b>Run from a clone (contributors)</b></summary> ```bash git clone https://github.com/malindarathnayake/stencil-mcp.git cd stencil-mcp python -m unitteFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.run=subprocess.run([sys.executable,str(ROOT/'server.py')],input='not json\n'+json.dumps(req('ping'))+'\n',text=True,capture_output=True,timeout=5)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.run=subprocess.run([sys.executable,str(ROOT/'server.py')],input='\n'.join(json.dumps(x) for x in lines)+'\n',text=True,encoding='utf-8',capture_output=True,timeout=15)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.s=scene();s['nodes'][0]['label']='\u0645\u06cc\u200c\u062e\u0648\u0627\u0647\u0645';self.assertTrue(validate(s)['valid'])Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.run=subprocess.run([sys.executable,str(ROOT/'server.py')],input=lines,text=True,encoding='utf-8',capture_output=True,timeout=10)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for stencil-mcp@0.2.2 as of 4 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim malindarathnayake: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- Hex-encoded string detected≈ +4 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unicode escape sequence detected≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.