Skills/PyPI/ssh-mcp-server-copilot

ssh-mcp-server-copilot@0.1.4

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Hardened SSH MCP server for VS Code / Copilot Chat — run policy-scoped commands on remote hosts via natural language" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher bhayanak · publishing for 254 daysInstalls 82Last detonated 7 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
SSH_MCP_AUTH_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: SSH_MCP_CONFIG_DIR
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for SSH_MCP_AUTH_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx ssh-mcp-server-copilot

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Access to sensitive file paths; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Privileged sudo commandconfig/templates.json:35 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges"command": "sudo systemctl restart {service}",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/ssh_mcp/cli.py:5 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesinit Create ~/.ssh-mcp with default configsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_config.py:26 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetpl.render({"service": "nginx; rm -rf /"})Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/ssh_mcp/defaults/templates.json:35 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges"command": "sudo systemctl restart {service}",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_config.py:26 · Destructive file system command detectedtpl.render({"service": "nginx; rm -rf /"})Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/ssh_mcp/config.py:14 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Return the default config directory: ~/.ssh-mcp"""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
AWS access key pattern detectedtests/test_redact.py:8 · AWS access key pattern detected — possible hardcoded or harvested keytext = "key is AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_config.py:52 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filestpl.render({"lines": "10", "log_path": "/etc/shadow"})Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsvscode-extension/package.json:45 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"description": "Config directory (default: ~/.ssh-mcp). Maps to SSH_MCP_CONFIG_DIR."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈70 tok
1 file · 40 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for ssh-mcp-server-copilot@0.1.4 as of 6 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim bhayanak: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. AWS access key pattern detected≈ +2 on the totalNever read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
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