ssh-mcp-server-copilot@0.1.4
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Hardened SSH MCP server for VS Code / Copilot Chat — run policy-scoped commands on remote hosts via natural language" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
SSH_MCP_AUTH_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: SSH_MCP_CONFIG_DIR- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for SSH_MCP_AUTH_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Access to sensitive file paths; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"command": "sudo systemctl restart {service}",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.init Create ~/.ssh-mcp with default configsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.tpl.render({"service": "nginx; rm -rf /"})Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."command": "sudo systemctl restart {service}",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.tpl.render({"service": "nginx; rm -rf /"})Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."""Return the default config directory: ~/.ssh-mcp"""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.text = "key is AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.tpl.render({"lines": "10", "log_path": "/etc/shadow"})Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."description": "Config directory (default: ~/.ssh-mcp). Maps to SSH_MCP_CONFIG_DIR."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for ssh-mcp-server-copilot@0.1.4 as of 6 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim bhayanak: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- AWS access key pattern detected≈ +2 on the totalNever read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.