Skills/PyPI/snipara-mcp

snipara-mcp@4.0.2

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "MCP connector for Snipara, the Project Brain for AI coding agents" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher alopez3006 · publishing for 303 daysInstalls 1,069Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add snipara-mcp -- uvx snipara-mcp
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
6 of 6 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
SNIPARA_API_KEYSNIPARA_IGNORE_OAUTH or --max-tokensConfiguration, not credentials: SNIPARA_API_URL, SNIPARA_PROJECT_ID, SNIPARA_PROJECT_SLUG, SNIPARA_TOOL_PROFILE
Where it talks to
snipara.com (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for SNIPARA_API_KEY, SNIPARA_IGNORE_OAUTH and talks to snipara.com. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets SNIPARA_API_KEY=snipara.com,SNIPARA_IGNORE_OAUTH=snipara.com -- uvx snipara-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 3.0.0

vet-skills diff snipara-mcp 3.0.0 4.0.2

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 3.0.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'httpx'
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'httpx'
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.4sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'httpx'
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.6sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'httpx'
0.6sprocess6 of 6 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.6sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.6sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.6sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_mcp_e2e.py:90 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkmonkeypatch.setattr(mcp_server.httpx, "AsyncClient", async_client_factory)Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsrc/snipara_mcp/rlm_tools.py:246 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsraise ValueError("Snipara API key required. Set SNIPARA_API_KEY or pass api_key parameter.")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/snipara_mcp/cli.py:249 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_mcp_e2e.py:168 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkmonkeypatch.setattr(mcp_server, "API_URL", "https://fixture.snipara.test")Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/snipara_mcp/cli.py:328 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Add SNIPARA_API_KEY to .env.example if not present."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/snipara_mcp/cli.py:330 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_local_path = Path.cwd() / ".env.local.example"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filessrc/snipara_mcp/cli.py:557 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction filedocs_to_upload.append(("CLAUDE.md", (cwd / "CLAUDE.md").read_text()))Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/snipara_mcp/cli.py:329 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_path = Path.cwd() / ".env.example"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_mcp_e2e.py:115 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkmonkeypatch.setattr(mcp_server, "API_URL", "https://fixture.snipara.test")Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈52 tok
1 file · 25 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for snipara-mcp@4.0.2 as of 48 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.