Skills/PyPI/snipara-mcp

snipara-mcp@3.0.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "MCP connector for Snipara, the Project Brain for AI coding agents" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher alopez3006 · publishing for 299 daysInstalls 501Last detonated 5d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
SNIPARA_API_KEYSNIPARA_IGNORE_OAUTH or --max-tokensConfiguration, not credentials: SNIPARA_API_URL, SNIPARA_PROJECT_ID, SNIPARA_PROJECT_SLUG, SNIPARA_TOOL_PROFILE
Where it talks to
snipara.com (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for SNIPARA_API_KEY, SNIPARA_IGNORE_OAUTH and talks to snipara.com. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets SNIPARA_API_KEY=snipara.com,SNIPARA_IGNORE_OAUTH=snipara.com -- uvx snipara-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Credential pass-through configuration; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsrc/snipara_mcp/rlm_tools.py:246 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsraise ValueError("Snipara API key required. Set SNIPARA_API_KEY or pass api_key parameter.")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_mcp_e2e.py:90 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkmonkeypatch.setattr(mcp_server.httpx, "AsyncClient", async_client_factory)Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
LOW
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filessrc/snipara_mcp/cli.py:557 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files · informational: not an instruction filedocs_to_upload.append(("CLAUDE.md", (cwd / "CLAUDE.md").read_text()))Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_mcp_e2e.py:115 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkmonkeypatch.setattr(mcp_server, "API_URL", "https://fixture.snipara.test")Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/snipara_mcp/cli.py:249 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/snipara_mcp/cli.py:330 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_local_path = Path.cwd() / ".env.local.example"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_mcp_e2e.py:166 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkmonkeypatch.setattr(mcp_server, "API_URL", "https://fixture.snipara.test")Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/snipara_mcp/cli.py:329 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_path = Path.cwd() / ".env.example"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/snipara_mcp/cli.py:328 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Add SNIPARA_API_KEY to .env.example if not present."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈52 tok
1 file · 22 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for snipara-mcp@3.0.0 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim alopez3006: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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