Skills/PyPI/simple-snowflake-mcp

simple-snowflake-mcp@0.3.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Simple Snowflake MCP Server to work behind a corporate proxy" Observed in sandbox: calls astral.sh only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher yann-barraud-yann · publishing for 499 daysInstalls 61Last detonated 55 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
SNOWFLAKE_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: CONFIG_FILE, MCP_READ_ONLY, SNOWFLAKE_ACCOUNT, SNOWFLAKE_USER
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso astral.sh — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · reached only astral.sh
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names astral.sh as well as its own vendor. The guard injects SNOWFLAKE_PASSWORD only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx simple-snowflake-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: calls astral.sh only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.0snetworkCONNECT tcp://astral.sh:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.0sprocessexec /usr/bin/cp
0.0sprocessexited 127: ./setup.sh: line 22: uv: command not found
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.2snetworkCONNECT tcp://astral.sh:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.2sprocessexited 127: ./setup.sh: line 22: uv: command not found

Static findings

MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellsetup.sh:9 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.yml:18 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssetup.sh:14 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif [ ! -f .env ]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssetup.sh:15 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesecho "📝 Création du fichier .env..."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:32 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschown -R mcp:mcp /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssetup.sh:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescp .env.example .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:45 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…out, connection reuse, rate limiting, notes bounds, and MCP capabilities. 2. **`.env`** — Snowflake credentials read **lazily** at connect time by `get_snowflake_co…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/simple_snowflake_mcp/server.py:23 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load environment variables from the .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.yml:48 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternsetup.sh:9 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_security.py:165 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesmonkeypatch.setenv("CONFIG_FILE", "../../../../etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:203 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary>Development/Unpublished Servers Configuration</summary> ```json "mcpServers": { "simple_snowflake_mcp": { "command": "uv", "args": [ "--directory", "."Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssetup.sh:13 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Créer .env si nécessaireFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,461 tok
2 files · 21 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for simple-snowflake-mcp@0.3.0 as of 22 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim yann-barraud-yann: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  4. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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